Whatever else they may do, Soviet leaders seem to travel well.
In the first visit to the U.S. of a Soviet party boss since Nikita Khrushchev's boisterous tour in 1959, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev spent eight days in America, apparently taking ebullient joy in almost every moment of his stay as Richard Nixon's guest. His mission was, of course, deadly serious: he wants U.S. money, technological know-how and hardware to develop the Soviet economy. In return, he implied future flexibility on arms control and proffered access to the Soviet Union's cornucopia of raw materials and a considerable amount of purposeful good will and bonhomie. It was a masterly performance aimed at erasing in American minds the cold war image of Russia as antagonist and replacing it with a vision of a peaceful, stable and sophisticated trading partner.
One result was a marked contrast in the demeanor of host and guest. Shadowed by Watergate, Nixon often seemed subdued and ill at ease, anxious to stick to the schedule and limit the hoopla. Brezhnev, though largely kept out of public range for security reasons, acted when he had an audience like a back-slapping drummer. He took every opportunity to clown for photographers, converse with reporters and mix with folks, chatting and shaking hands. There were moments when the President of the U.S. almost found himself shunted to the sidelines, and on one occasion Nixon observed: "He's the best politician in the room."
Out of range of cameras and crowds, Brezhnev reverted to the more familiar role of the tough bargainer who has staked his own political career on improving relations with the U.S. for the benefit of the Soviet economy.
There were no monumental accords signed; yet the meetings enhanced both leaders' images as international statesmen. Overall, even the minor agreements served to spur on the momentum of cordial top-level negotiations between the two countries that began with Nixon's visit to Moscow last year.
Code of Ethics. The ritual of summitry requires that there be one surprise, no matter how mild. This session's package was an agreement of mutual forbearance from nuclear war, which included such points as consulting with each other if there is a risk of war and trying not to provoke confrontations with third countries. In essence, the document formalized practices already followed by both sides, like the Moscow-Washington hot line. But it also amounted to a pact between the two superpowers to cooperate—if not in managing the world, in managing world peace. Thus it applies to their relations with China as well as the Middle East and other world flashpoints, though the wording is vague enough to allow each government to pursue present policies, for instance American bombing in Cambodia or Russian intervention in Eastern Europe.
Of equal importance to that nuclear code of ethics was an agreement to complete SALT II negotiations for a permanent limit on offensive nuclear arms by the end of 1974, three years before the end of the five-year temporary "freeze" reached as part of SALT I last year. As further earnest of Brezhnev's good intentions, he joined with Nixon in concluding a wide range of agreements that had been worked out before the summit began. The two leaders also pledged their countries to: