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Now that the U.S. is embroiled in Viet Nam, Americans may wonder how the President could have acquired so much power Yet it was only a few short years ago that most liberals in politics and in the academy considered a strong presidency essential to democracy. A good case can be made for presidential power in foreign affairs. Diplomatic negotiations cannot be left to a many-headed Congress with myriad political commitments and conflicting personalities. America had to speak with one voice not many. As the U.S. role increased in world affairs, the President took charge of an ever-expanding military, diplomatic and intelligence Establishment. With annihilation of the nation a genuine possibility in the nuclear age, only the President could have the power to make quick life-or-death decisions. There seemed to be no other way.
But power in such quantity is an ever-present temptation. The line between constitutional and unconstitutional acts became blurred. Congressional power to declare war atrophied; in effect the President did it on his own—in Korea, in Viet Nam and to a lesser degree in a host of other places, like Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, where the President committed American forces momentarily. The process has a cumulative effect. Once the President has made a certain commitment of troops, he may feel compelled to send still more to protect his original investment. Viet Nam is the tragic outcome of a process that nobody really meant to start and nobody quite knows how to stop.
The question is how to correct the imbalance and restore to Congress its proper role in the conduct of foreign affairs. Congressmen quite naturally, are not of one mind on the war. Without a working hostile majority, they cannot put up solid opposition to the President's policies, and Nixon conquers partly by dividing Beyond that, once a war is undertaken and American lives are at stake, the President's men and others, too, are reluctant to jeopardize the war effort. It would be unpatriotic and politically hazardous. Hence the unwillingness of Congress to cut off appropriations for the war.
One promising approach is a law that would inhibit the President's warmaking powers by reinforcing the badly eroded constitutional right of Congress to declare and support a war. Several such bills have been introduced that would not apply to Viet Nam but to any future Viet Nams. Most discussed is the proposal of New York's Republican Senator Jacob Javits to limit unilateral military action by the President to specific instances where the U.S. or its armed forces have been attacked. The President could also take military action to protect American lives and property abroad or to carry out the terms of a treaty or other agreement ratified by Congress. But unless approved by Congress, hostilities would have to end in 30 days. Obviously, such a bill would not completely restrain the President, given his ample resources. But it would bring Congress into the decision-making process as never before.