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Yet in much of the world and in the U.S., the bold venture was greeted with elation; a sense of fresh possibilities stirred dusty chancelleries around the globe. France-Soir observed that Nixon's decision "radically alters the international situation. It opens immense perspectives for the future of the world." At home, though there was some scattered protest from the right, a Harris public opinion survey found the U.S. public approving of the China trip by a margin of 68% to 19%.
The move was far from a sudden Nixon impulse. Less than two weeks after his Inauguration, he had sent Kissinger a memo declaring: "I think we should give every encouragement to the idea that this Administration is seeking rapprochement with the Chinese." But it was typical of the Nixon style to camouflage his intentions, work quietly through Kissinger's National Security Council and order thorough study before unfurling his fait accompli. A Government-wide review of China policy, initiated by one of Kissinger's galvanizing National Security staff memorandums (there have been 143 so far) in 1969, took six months to complete. A second, begun in 1970, took five months. The secret documents steadily proliferated. Before he took off for Peking, Kissinger had accumulated three volumes of messages about the trip. Only Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers had copies. Kissinger's two-volume briefing books were marked: TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY.
Meeting thrice weekly at 6 p.m. in the privacy of Nixon's hideaway in the Executive Office Building or in the White House Lincoln Sitting Room, Kissinger and the President plotted their elaborate exchange of signals with the Chinese. Kissinger concentrated on the broad strategy, while Nixon, says Kissinger, was "enormously ingenious" in originating about 70% of the secret ways of communicating with Peking. Although table tennis was hardly anticipated as the vehicle, Chou's willingness to invite Americans into China was not a surprise. After the table tennis team's visit, Nixon was ready with a response. He announced that the U.S. was eager to seek ways of trading with China. Kissinger's trip in July followed.
With his usual thoroughness, Nixon is rigorously preparing himself for his journey in February. He is reading Dennis Bloodworth's The Chinese Looking Glass, John K. Fairbank's The United States and China, Francis Hsu's Americans and Chinese. He is working his way through thickets of memos from Kissinger, who returned with 500 pages of notes from his two separate flights to confer with Chou. All of those notes have been broken down by topic; the Chinese position on each subject is being exhaustively researched and a Nixon response or initiative is being outlined. Such intensive study is as necessary as it is Nixonian. Presidential aides concede that China has little to lose at the summit; if there is any way to take advantage of Nixon, the Chinese undoubtedly will try.
Major Questions. More than anything else, Nixon's outreach to the East symbolized