(2 of 4)
McGovern spoke with an almost old-fashioned moral fervor, and even those who disagree with his program could hardly fail to be moved by his anguish for America. To point up the horror of the war, he recalled the memorable photograph of the Vietnamese girl Kim running naked from a napalm attack. It was a grim parallel to Nixon's use of Tanya, the Leningrad girl orphaned in World War II, to plead his case for rapprochement and peace in the world. Yet McGovern spoiled a sound point by arguing that if the U.S. can accommodate itself to a billion Russian and Chinese Communists, it can learn to live with a small group of guerrilla Communists. That is hardly an adequate description of North Viet Nam's army, well supplied by Russia and China. He seemed visibly embarrassed as he awkwardly straddled the amnesty question; he asserted that war resisters should be allowed to come home without punishment but stated that "personally, if I were in their position," he would volunteer to serve two years in compensatory public service programs.
Does McGovern's plan amount to surrender, as Administration spokesmen charge? It would almost certainly mean the sudden departure of President Thieu and perhaps the demise of an independent South Viet Nam. McGovern would not seek any guarantees from Hanoi, which could resume its attack on the South after the U.S. withdrawal without fear of U.S. airpower. It is essentially an act of faith on McGovern's part to believe that Hanoi would not do so, just as it is an act of faith to believe that the P.O.W.s would be promptly released. The Communists have, however, suggested that they would release the prisoners following a U.S. withdrawal, much as they did following the French departure. As McGovern noted in his speech, Pierre Mendès-France managed to stop the fighting within five weeks after he won the French premiership on an end-the-war platform in 1954; France's 11,000 P.O.W.s were repatriated within three months.
McGovern argues that a quick pull-out would vastly benefit the U.S. The war has badly scarred the country's image abroad, he says; by acknowledging its "mistake," he suggests, the U.S. would not lose but would recover its international prestige just as France did. But most important to McGovern is "the special healing" that he believes would begin in America once its divisive military involvement in Southeast Asia ended. The Administration replies that McGovern's position is foolish, that he would give up too much too easily at a time when the North Vietnamese seem to be preparing to back off from their maximum goals. Even if McGovern wants to get out of Indochina, Administration staffers argue persuasively, his proposal to close out the U.S. presence throughout all of Southeast Asia, including Thailand, seems unnecessary.