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Made in America. Big Minh has been presented as the peace candidate and the Buddhist hero of the 1963 coup. In fact, as admitted by one of his aides, his peace stance hardly differs from Thieu's; the important thing is that Hanoi says it will not talk with Thieu, but will talk with someone else.
Minh's real strength is that he is a southerner, a nationalist, a reputably good soldier and a sympathetic personality.
Thieu's great advantage lies in his control of a huge government and military machine ("made in America," says Minh) that can be used for campaigning, pressuring the voters, and, if necessary, falsifying the results. On that account alone, Thieu's ticket is regarded as unbeatable by most observers.
It is widely believed, however, that Thieu could win without resorting to dubious tactics. Moreover, as a career officer and a Catholic, he has substantial support among the 1,000,000 members of the military and Catholics, 2,000,000 strong in a population of 17 million. He should win strong support in the populous Mekong Delta with help from his wife and his running mate, ex-Premier Tran Van Huong, who are both closely identified with that area. Huong, a two-time mayor of Saigon, should also help Thieu win votes in the capital.
Political Disruption. Thieu has grown increasingly intractable as far as the U.S. is concerned. The gradual U.S. withdrawal has significantly decreased Washington's leverage in Saigon. The new U.S. approach to China has reduced that leverage further, largely because Thieu fears that a deal is about to be worked out that will undermine him and his government. Thieu has made little headway in binding up the nation's wounds. The morale of the ARVN is low, the government has failed to confront the financial crisis evolving from U.S. withdrawal, and corruption gnaws relentlessly at the nation's moral fiber.
A recently captured Viet Cong document takes note of these difficulties. While conceding the Communists' military inferiority, the document describes their political prospects with confidence. "We should clearly realize," it continues, "that although the enemy has gained some temporary results, he has suffered serious political failure and given us absolute political superiority." If the document presages a shift in Communist strategy from the military to the political, Big Minh and Little Minh could turn out to be the least of Thieu's problems.