(7 of 7)
Lead from Strength. Throughout his testimony, McNamara—sometimes in the past a thin-skinned congressional witness—displayed calm confidence, repeated his conviction that the U.S., in the immensity of its nuclear arsenal, will maintain, or even increase, its military superiority over the rest of the world's powers. He faced squarely up to the fact that there are risks under the treaty provisions: "I do not pretend that this or any other agreement between great, contending powers can be risk-free. This one is not. Perhaps the most serious risk of this treaty is the risk of euphoria. We must guard against a condition of mind which allows us to become lax in our defenses." But he pledged against such laxity: "This treaty is a product of Western strength. Further progress in arms-control arrangements with the Soviet Union—progress which we all want to make—depends critically on the maintenance of that strength."
Certainly, no Government leader with any semblance of sanity would ever publicly advocate anything but maintaining vastly superior U.S. nuclear strength. But an omnipotent arsenal must continue to be a fact—never just a politician's platitude.
Although the U.S. no longer has a perfect world monopoly on atomic power, as it had in the late 1940s, its strength is still so overwhelming that it can indeed use it to preserve the peace with the absolute confidence it had 15 years ago. Thus, any treaty-inspired euphoria that softens the arsenal or lets down the nuclear guard is unthinkable.
*The fissionable material—raw plutonium or uranium 235—for U.S. atomic weapons is in thousands of steel containers buried somewhere west of the Mississippi and east of the Rockies. Of about 600 tons produced since World War II, some 400 tons are for weapons, the rest for peaceful projects.