Algeria: The Not So Secret Army

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precariously narrow ledge. From far left to far right, De Gaulle is under attack by France's politicians. Members of his own government are suspected of opposing his Algerian solution, especially Premier Michel Debre, who on the record has favored a tougher line than De Gaulle in opposing the F.L.N. and supports a French Algeria. With the French people, De Gaulle's popularity may have somewhat diminished, but he still has a powerful hold on them. He and they are locked in a special political embrace: they need him because they know that no one else stands a chance of securing an Algerian settlement; he needs them because he knows that the support of the nation, over the heads of the politicians, over the heads of dissident or doubting generals, enables him to act for France.

Last week strong hints that an Algerian settlement was near came from Louis Joxe. 60, Minister of Algerian Affairs, an unconditional Gaullist, who is in charge of the delicate treaty dealings with the Moslem F.L.N. Back from a quick visit to Algeria. Joxe pointed out that the bloodletting in the cities was obscuring the peace and quiet of the populous countryside. He seemed to hint that a tacit cease-fire already existed between the French army and the F.L.N. to enable the Gaullist government to deal with Salan. The F.L.N. was reported ready to 1 ) recognize the "quasi-permanent'' nature of several French military bases in Algeria, 2) concede that Algeria's economic future is linked to France and that the departure of the entire European population would be catastrophic, and 3) accept that the presence of some French armed forces in Algeria, even after the ceasefire, will contribute to peace.

Informal Charges. With a settlement near, the S.A.O. faces a set of difficult alternatives. An immediate mass uprising might actually work to De Gaulle's advantage by giving him the chance to invoke martial law in Algeria—which he has so far hesitated to do—and thus choke off the rebellion by drafting men into the army, requisitioning property, arresting and interning suspects without formal charges. On the other hand, the uprising could also come too late; Salan cannot possibly hope to prevail against the F.L.N. without at least partial army support, and there are signs that the longer his terrorists go on murdering Gaullist officers, the greater becomes the disgust of the French army.

Both Salan and De Gaulle are gambling on the response of the army to an uprising. Salan is convinced that the soldiers will not open fire on Algeria's Europeans, and that a sizable body of troops will actually join him. De Gaulle believes that the majority of the army will support the government because 1) it recognizes that Algérie française is dead, and 2) it does not wish to go against the will of the French nation, which is overwhelmingly for an Algerian settlement. De Gaulle guesses that when the French-F.L.N. treaty is signed, the S.A.O. might seize Algiers, Oran, and possibly Bone. He is betting that the army will then obey his orders to cordon off the S.A.O. rebel cities and choke them into submission.

Man on Horseback. The French army of 1,000,000 men (about half in Algeria) and of venerable traditions has developed a schizoid personality. It is the only army in the world that has been fighting continuously for the past 22 years—World War II,