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On the Fence. Washington itself has moved closer to Britain's always pragmatic attitude that, as long as there are fences, there will be fence-sitters and each should be dealt with in terms of his size, influence and fence-sitting position. The British felt that Dulles' "Neutrality is immoral" policy was unnecessarily dogmatic. Some Britons now think Eisenhower has gone unnecessarily far in the other direction by urging neutrality on the African states. Complained one: "We didn't bring Nigeria up to be neutral, and we bloody well don't want her to be neutral."
Four years ago the U.S. was anxiously instructing all the world's neutrals in the dangers of Communism, worriedly warned that the devious Communists would worm their way into any neutralist regime and make off with it. The U.S. has learned that a strong nationalist government, firmly rooted in its own people, can defend itself against Communism's blandishments and pressures, not on behalf of the West but on its own behalf. In their turn, neutralists have watched Communism operate, and learned to be wary. India has learned that Red China talks peace but grabs off border lands that have been traditionally Indian. After the Suez invasion, Egypt's Nasser accepted the embrace of the Russian bear and has been warily disentangling himself ever since. Iraq's Karim Kassem cut his nation adrift from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact and welcomed Russian aid. He soon found the Communists were using the situation to dislodge him from power, and has cracked down on domestic Reds and grown more standoffish with the Soviets.
The U.S. now even seems to encourage independence in the Communist camp itself. In the opinion of one State Department official, Tito of Yugoslavia "is the Martin Luther of Communism and it is to our interest to see that kind of Protestantism flourish. We want to make sure Tito stays independent." Last week Poland's Gomulka left Manhattan for home, with a promise of a renewal of the most-favored nation status, which has been suspended since 1951.
The Tilt. Do alliances then no longer matter? In general terms, the U.S. would like to keep decisively on its side those nations which border the vast Communist heartland and which present the first barrier against Red seepage. Those nations are most threatened, and their fate is most crucial to the free world. Said the Philippines' Chief Delegate Francisco Delgado: "We cannot all be neutrals. Some of us have to perform the unpleasant and even dangerous duty of helping to keep the scales of power in equilibrium. The moment these scales are badly tilted one way or the other, the neutrals are not only out of business, but war becomes inevitable." U.S. concern with Laos results from the fear that, should it fall into Communist hands, Thailand and all Southeast Asia would be instantly threatened.
The neutralism that the U.S. is learning to accept is of the sort the U.S. itself practiced during its early days as a nation: that beneficial isolation which relieves new countries of the risks of associating themselves with big power rivalries. It does not mean neutralism that sees no difference between democracy and Communism. It does mean that the U.S. can support the noncommitment expressed by one Indonesian: "We are not neutralist; we are independent."