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Empire's Course. Communism was the first force since the rise of the nation states to call for a real world order, but it failed even to begin to create one, or really to come to terms with nationalism. Even though in many areas Communism uses nationalism as a vehicle, the two remain essentially inimical. The supranational loyalty to Moscow, which Stalin enforced through sheer power and terror, was artificial. Moscow is not the Third Rome. What started under Stalin, continued with Tito's defection, and goes on ever more intensely under Khrushchev, is the reascendancy of nationalism over Communism, of self-interest over ideology.
Much of the ideological invective between Moscow and Peking camouflages rivalry between two great if unequal powers. Mao's pride in his ideological subtlety and his own Chinese Communist revolution—which he accomplished largely unaided by Russia—obviously mingles with his pride in an ancient culture and his contempt for Khrushchev as a belly-slapping vulgarian.
Much of Russia's anger at China's pretensions to lead Asia and Africa mingles with immemorial fears of the invading "Golden Horde" and "the Yellow Peril." Russia's course eastward to the Pacific has collided with China's course northward to the empty spaces of Siberia. Khrushchev and all Russians must be deeply worried by the thought that in 1970, they may be living next door to hundreds of millions of hostile Chinese who by then will probably have nuclear weapons.
Among Russia's European satellites, nationalism has also reasserted itself as it has in the West—and it gets stronger as fear of Khrushchev's Russia diminishes. That is why alliances on both sides are in a state of flux, and therein also lies one of the dangers to the West.
Risky Distinctions. To the West, the ultimate question raised by the Sino-Soviet split is whether it bodes good or ill. All Communist splits, big or small, are essentially the result of failures—failure to meet a goal, failure to measure up to reality. One failure behind the present Sino-Soviet quarrel is Russia's recent inability to make headway in the cold war; another is the glaring fact that more than four decades after the revolution, communism is nowhere able to match the capitalist standard of living. In this respect, the West can obviously take heart from the split.
A more fundamental question is whether the Khrushchev line denotes only a temporary, tactical change in Communism or a more profound one. All Communists, no matter of what stripe, still share the aim of defeating capitalism; but this statement, while as true as ever, is no longer a sufficient analysis of the situation. Some of the metamorphoses that Communism has undergone may have begun as tactical moves which in effect make Communism more attractive, but may end up meaning more—for example, Yugoslavia's compromises with free enterprise, the Italian Communist Party's championship of the small businessman.
The results of Khrushchev's destalinization drive, which began in 1956, are still shaking the Communist world; "re-stalinization," a return to despotic control by Moscow, is not impossible, but could be accomplished only through violent upheaval. Thus the notion that the U.S. now deals with a totally new form of Communism is widely accepted. Among