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The Generals. At week's end martial law was gradually eased, and some Buddhists and students were freed. There was little doubt that Nhu was in large measure responsible for running things, but there was no evidence that he was supplanting his brother; as far as could be detected, the two were working in harmony. Directly under Nhu, two officers seemed to be in command: be spectacled, pockmarked Colonel Le Quang Tung, in charge of the Special Forces, and Brigadier General Ton That Dinh, commander of the III Army Corps and military governor of Saigon, a dapper graduate of the U.S. Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, who wears a red beret, carries a swagger stick, and likes to be accompanied on military operations by his own photographer. Of South Viet Nam's 17 generals, Dinh is one of two who actually have troops at their disposal; the other, Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh, is located in a fighting area hundreds of miles north of Saigon.
Most of the other generals have been deprived of real power by Diem and Nhu, and have been brought to Saigon where they can be watched. At a time when the army is more important than ever in the South Viet Nam situation, these officers are carefully scrutinized in Washington. Among them:
> Major General Tran Van Don, chief of the general staff and technically in charge of administering the country under martial law. Actually he commands only a bodyguard of 50 troops, and at the moment is considered a figurehead.
> Brigadier General Tran Tu Oai, an articulate officer whom Nhu sidetracked into the post of director of the malaria eradication program. "I'm the only general in the army," said Tran, "who is armed with a spray gun." He is now chief of psychological warfare.
> Major General Duong Van Minh, a tough, husky type whose mouth is filled with gold-capped broken teeth and who is regarded as one of the best officers in South Viet Nam. He is known as "Big" Minh, to distinguish him from Brigadier General Tran Van Minh, or "Little" Minh, no kin. He has no command at present, but serves as Diem's "military assistant."
— Brigadier General Pham Xuan Chien, onetime director of security services, who was sacked by Nhu when his ambitions began to get out of hand. He now has the virtually meaningless job of assistant chief of staff.
Determined to dissociate itself from Diem's anti-Buddhist policies—and to keep the army on its side—the U.S. formally absolved South Viet Nam's military leaders of responsibility in Nhu's sacking of the Buddhist temples. In an unusually sharp statement, Washington said that the generals were "not aware of the plans to attack the pagodas, much less the brutal manner in which they were carried out." Saigon bitterly denied the Washington statement, produced a document signed by army leaders to the effect that they had asked "the government to take the action it did." Top U.S. intelligence officials countered that army leaders had been coerced into signing the document.