(9 of 10)
Too Fast, Too Thin. The war is as ugly and indecisive as ever. The more bullish predictions emanate from Saigon. General Paul Harkins, commander of the U.S. forces in South Viet Nam, says that the war will be over in December; statistics show that the Viet Cong launched an average of 120 attacks weekly last year, and for the first seven months this year the average was down to 74. But statistics are meaningless in South Viet Nam. Despite losses of 1,000 men a month, the Reds have increased their hard-core regular troops from 18,000 to 23,000 men.
There are some reasons for optimism. Substantial progress has been made in the central highlands, where U.S. Special Forces teams have molded 150,000 montagnard tribesmen into a tough, well-trained jungle force that is effectively harassing Viet Cong supply lines from Communist North Viet Nam. The government has embarked on a crash program to construct some 12,000 "strategic hamlets." fortified villages where the peasants will be guarded against Viet Cong attacks by trained, well-armed militiamen. Already 9,750,000 people—65% of the population—have been settled in the 7,500 hamlets that have been built so far.
U.S. officials fear that the hamlet program, headed by Mme. Nhu's husband, is spreading too fast and too thin, and that too many of the strongholds are not really defensible against determined Red attack. In the strategically important Mekong River delta, moreover, the well-armed Viet Cong operates with near impunity. For the first time in months, the Reds are consistently raising attacks in battalion-size strength, are showing an increasing tendency to stand and fight against government forces instead of fading away into the paddies.
Evidence Intrigue. All the Vietnamese military commanders are fighting with one eye cocked on Saigon. Generals are reluctant to commit troops to a large role, because Diem disapproves of generals who have heavy casualties. Always in fear of another coup against his regime, Diem also distrusts successful generals and shifts them about constantly to keep them from developing a power base.
In Saigon, intrigue is endemic. A new plot is hatched or at least talked about daily. Diem and his family are aware of most of the talk, and their nerve is good. Suggesting that there will be a coup unless the Buddhist crisis is brought under control, Nhu keeps his elaborate secret police network constantly on the alert. In government "reeducation centers" throughout the country are an estimated 20,000 political internees. According to one report, the new contingency plan against a coup is to draw regiments from the worst Viet Cong areas to the capital, a "deliberately dangerous" plan designed to make the Americans fear that a coup would only lead to Communist advances.
That is precisely what the U.S. does fear.