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Damnation. The prospect of evoking anti-Americanism in France had long deterred the U.S. from taking a clear-cut stand for negotiation with the Algerian rebels. Now that the U.S. was being damned for the thought, it might as well be damned for the deed. There were, in fact, compelling reasons to act. With the fall of the Gaillard government the Murphy-Beeley good offices mission went into a state of "suspension" from which it may well never emerge. In Tunis dynamic little Habib Bourguiba announced that, "out of courtesy" to France's 76-year-old President Coty, he was prepared to wait one week for France to find a new government. After that, he would go back to the U.N. Security Council with Tunisia's complaint over the bombing of Sakiet. If Bourguiba makes good on his warning, the result is likely to be a rich propaganda harvest for Russia, a weakening of Western influence in North Africa.
Within 48 hours of Gaillard's fall, a "top diplomatic source"—whom Frenchmen unanimously took to be Good Officer Robert Murphy, the U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State—said that the U.S. had decided it must now give top priority to keeping North Africa loyal to the free world, and that to achieve this, it might be necessary for the French government to enter into direct negotiations with the Algerian rebels. Next day, in response to anguished outcries from French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, the State Department, after the immemorial manner of diplomacy, blandly denied that there had been any change in U.S. policy on Algeria. But even in the denying, Washington emphasized U.S. anxiety for "a peaceful, democratic and just solution" to the Algerian war.
Government by Martyr. The new U.S. determination to jockey France toward a North African settlement considerably complicated President Coty's task of finding a man willing and able to step into Gaillard's shoes. Yet there were signs that for all the outcry, the U.S. pressure was causing some Frenchmen to reflect, along with Paris Presse, that "it is not possible for France to carry on its policy in Algeria without the U.S." Given the growth of this mood, there was one ray of hope: France's last two Premiers adopted and put into effect the very policies which led to the defeat of their predecessors; it is possible, therefore, that Gaillard's successor will be allowed to push through the policy which caused Gaillard's fall. "If that happens," suggested one British observer, "France will have found a handy new formula for progress—government by martyr."