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Strumming Guitars. Here and there amidst the soft guitars could be heard an occasional rattle of rearguard musketry. In faraway Manila, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the SEATO Council that the U.S. would negotiate "any" disarmament agreement with the U.S.S.R., but only provided that the agreement 1) could be inspected and enforced, 2) would not tilt the balance of power the Kremlin's way. Dulles' point, reiterated again and again, was that sure peace lies only in sure strength. Even so, the London Times told its readers accurately: "In Britain public opinion is keener than the government in pressing for summit talks . . . Such is not the case in the U.S. . . . The Administration is as likely to rouse criticism as applause by appearing too eager to talk with the Russians."
The irony of the whole situation is that it is the U.S.S.R., avidly yearning for the summit, that ought by every diplomatic definition to be offering the concessions; the U.S., busy belatedly on its missile buildup, ought not to be volunteering concessions.
The irony was lost in the failure of the Administration to set—in private as well as in public—the firm, hard, lean line that effective peacemaking requires. Thus the irony reached its high point at week's end when the Kremlin's Nikita Khrushchev predicted, in the midst of a remarkable 9,000-word letter in Britain's socialist New Statesman, his unswerving faith in ultimate world victory for Communism. Said K.: "Such is the relentless course of historical development, and no one can halt it."