(7 of 7)
Half Success. In time, what might most seriously jeopardize Eden's political standing and stature at home is not the morality of his action, or the morality of his defense of it. It will be the judgment that his policy failed to achieve what it was designed to achieve, and that the cease-fire agreement was the final, inconclusive half-measure of a series of mis calculations. He had taken only half the canal, and Nasser was still in power. The canal was blocked, the Iraq pipeline sabotaged, and Britain faced a winter of cold homes and industrial shutdowns. Not for this should he have risked the good will of Britain's most powerful ally, outraged the Commonwealth, aroused the Arab world to outspoken hostility, incurred the opprobrium of the world, and divided his own country.
His miscalculations began with Nasser. Indications are that Eden never expected and certainly never prepared his nation for all-out war with Egypt. Instead, Eden apparently believed that Nasser was a straw sphinx who would crumble at the first threat of military action against him. Eden may also have underestimated the depth and vigor of the U.S. response, and of the amount of moral indignation toward aggression still left in the world.
Among many of his own countrymen Eden basked in momentary approval as a man who had made a good try. When the consequences are measured, including the damage to Britain's moral reputation and to the Middle East's security, Anthony Eden might in time look something less of a hero to his countrymen.