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The Chinese air force (two wings of F-84 Thunderjets and the beginnings of a wing of F-86 Sabre jets) is equipped to the bare level of a minimum defense. Its new commander, General "Tiger" Wang, is rated one of China's best military men. It has been held down, and is still being held down, by the U.S. decision that the Nationalists should not have any offensive capability of their own. This has applied even to fuel and ammunition supply. The small Nationalist navy (corvettes, destroyer escorts, LSTs) is adequate for blockade purposes, but would be negligible in an all-out fight.
Greatest doubt lies in the capability of Chinese command. Always haunted by the memory of defecting commanders on the mainland, Chiang makes it clear to commanders that his first requirement is unquestioning loyalty to himself. Thus, despite four years of U.S. effort, two major reorganizations and countless smaller ones, the primary requirement for responsible Chinese command is still personal. The determining characteristic of Chinese commanders is too often a paralyzing fear of taking any initiative without the Generalissimo's direct sanction.
If the Communists want simply to take Quemoy and the Matsus, they have plenty of troops, artillery and small craft for the job. What they do not have is air cover. Last week the Reds completed a jet air base at Luchiao (opposite the Tachens) and promptly moved 40 MIGs onto it. Far to the south, Nationalists detected another base abuilding near Swatow, which may not be complete for perhaps six months. But when it is, it will provide Communist jet air cover, not only for Quemoy and Matsu, but over the whole Formosa Strait. Then it would not be the offshore islands which were in danger; it would be Formosa itself.
Would the U.S. meet that challenge? Chiang thought he had had a pledge that the U.S. would defend Quemoy and the Matsus. But last week Secretary of State Dulles reiterated, as he has been doing lately, that "there has been no commitment, of any kind, sort or description, expressed or implied," to defend anything but Formosa and the Pescadores. "We have the jitters," admits one high Nationalist.
For the U.S., the answer is crucial not only to Formosa. It is also crucial to the whole area of Southeast Asia. Scattered from clattering, neon-bright Hong Kong to Saigon's gaudy Chinese city of Cholon, from stilt houses and river boats along Bangkok's green canals to high-walled compounds in Djakarta and Siantar in Sumatra, from bamboo slums to sleek modern apartments in Singapore, live 12 million Chinese. For them, Chiang and Formosa are the only counter to the pull of Communist China on their loyalty.
Already the Communists are energetically proselytizing among them. Said an old Chinese, sadly, in Bangkok: "Our young people are full of pride at what they think the Communists have done in China. They laugh at Chiang and at the corruption of his government when it was on the mainland. They do not know what real corruption means. The Communists, the incorruptible Communists, have extorted their savings and killed their families. Before, we took our strength from our families. Now, when you go down to the quay, you see the mothers and fathers weeping while their sons go off to China. None of them has come back yet, except as a spy, an agent or a corrupter."