(2 of 3)
The Arab resolution—described by Mahgoub as a step toward "human perfection, peace and security"—was a shrewd blend of the earlier Norwegian resolution and of the plan for a Middle East settlement outlined by Dag Hammarskjold at the opening meeting of the emergency session (TIME, Aug. 18). It proclaimed that the Assembly:
"Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the provisions of Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that 'each member state shall respect the system of government established in other member states' . . . and that 'each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.'
"Requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the governments concerned . . . such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the [U.N.] Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries . . ."
Crook Into Cop. Inside this velvet-lined grab bag there was something for almost everyone. For the neutralist powers of Asia, there was the firm reference to "early withdrawal of foreign troops"—a phrase which, to their distress, was missing from the Norwegian resolution. In the renewal of the Arab League pledges of noninterference in one another's affairs, there was a sop to U.S. and British concern over indirect aggression.
There were a few demurrers. Russia's Gromyko, complaining that the resolution did not call for "immediate withdrawal" of U.S. and British troops, threatened to reopen the debate at the next regular Assembly session (Sept. 16). From the Israelis came the bitter complaint that "This makes the Middle East's prime troublemakers—Nasser and the Arab League —into its policemen." But in the last analysis, nobody wanted to go on record as opposing an Arab solution to Arab problems, and when it came to a vote the resolution passed 80-0.*
Dreams & Delusions. In Washington and London this turn of events evoked cries of enthusiasm. After all, only a month before, both nations had been worried about standing in the dock for dispatching troops to the Middle East. The British had further cause for jubilation. If Dag Hammarskjold—who promptly announced that he would leave for the Middle East this week—could carry out his intention of persuading Jordan's King Hussein to accept "anything, from one individual to a substantial U.N. group," the way would be paved for a withdrawal of the British paratroopers hemmed in on Amman airfield. Confident young King Hussein was increasingly sure that his own troops could keep the peace, now that things seemed to be quieting down.