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When he appointed Oppenheimer, he was aware that there were suspicions, but he was not aware of all the derogatory material in the Atomic Energy Commission's bill of particulars for this hearing. If he had to make the same decision again, under the same conditions, he would appoint Oppenheimer. "In general, my policy was to consider the fact that the man was already in the project, and that made it very questionable whether I should separate him, and also whether I should separate him under what might be termed unpleasant conditions, because then you never know what you are going to do to him. Are you going to drive him over to the other side or not?"
A Piece of Idiocy. Despite the array of testimonials, the record contained evidence that clearly gave the board majority serious doubts about Oppenheimer as a security risk. In the list of witnesses against J. Robert Oppenheimer, the most effective was J. Robert Oppenheimer himself. His testimony showed that he had lied repeatedly in the past about important security matters. What he said in the hearing caused the board to comment, mildly enough, that Oppenheimer was even now being "less than candid." The most telling example of Oppenheimer's past capacity for untruths was drawn out in cross-examination about his relationships with his good friend Haakon Chevalier, a linguist who was once a professor at the University of California.
Chevalier was, by Oppenheimer's own testimony, a "fellow traveler" and "quite a Red." Oppenheimer's story about a key incident with Chevalier was brief enough.
Security Board Counsel Roger Robb*: Would you begin at the beginning and tell us exactly what happened? Oppenheimer: Yes. One day ... in the winter of 1942-43, Haakon Chevalier came to our home. It was, I believe, for dinner, but possibly for a drink. When I went out into the pantry, Chevalier followed me or came with me to help me. He said: "I saw George Eltenton [a Russian-trained scientist] recently." [He said that] Eltenton had told him that he had a method ... of getting technical information to Soviet scientists. He didn't describe the means. I thought I said, "But that is treason." I'm not sure. I said anyway something, "This is a terrible thing to do." Chevalier said or expressed complete agreement. That was the end of it. It was a very brief conversation.
But the full story of the incident was not so brief. Not until the next August—more than half a year after the incident occurred—did Oppenheimer say anything about it to security officers. And when he did, by his own testimony, he "invented a cock-and-bull story." Among the several officers he admitted lying to were General Groves and Colonel Boris T. Pash, an Army counterintelligence officer.
Security Board Counsel Robb: Did you tell Pash the truth about this thing? Oppenheimer: No.
Q: You lied to him?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you tell Pash that was not true?
A: That Eltenton had attempted to approach three members of the project . . . through intermediaries . . .
Q: So that we may be clear, did you discuss with or disclose to Pash the identity of Chevalier?
A: No.
Q: Let's refer for the time being to Chevalier as X.
A: All right . . .