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Change of Atmosphere. Even so, the atmosphere in Europe has changed. The conviction is widespread that the danger of world war has receded. This European feeling comes not so much from the propaganda of coexistence but from a number of other assumptions: that the Russian leaders are in no mood to start a world war; that the capacity to destroy New York and Detroit is not good enough if it results in the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad; that the Russian junta is not sufficiently in control of its own people, or secure enough from its own rivalries, to trigger World War III; that the new gang is a somewhat sedentary set of revolutionaries (compared, for example, with the cockier, more aggressive new rulers of China). Some or all of these assumptions might be fatally wrong, but they are widely held.
Fear & Exhortations. In this atmosphere, the U.S., which successfully rallied a coalition against Communist truculence, was finding less enthusiasm for combatting a smiling enemy. The fact is that Europe fears Communism much less than war. While it felt a clear and present danger of war, Europe responded to U.S. exhortation, but it does not respond similarly to alarms about Communism. Europeans have lived for centuries with neighbors who are implacably hostile and intent on destroying their way of life. Yet when an uninterested Europe let EDC go down, Western European statesmen saw with sudden clarity that something had to be done—that peace ultimately depends on strength.
Last week three of the most influential Western leaders reflected the changed atmosphere, by their words and attitudes. They were optimistic, but their optimism was conditional. In the House of Commons, Britain's Anthony Eden declared: "By negotiation from strength, we may be able to bring about a relaxation of the present tension . . . If we can bring stability and a common purpose in the West, we shall have established the essential basis on which we can seek an understanding with the East." In Washington, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer looked to the day when the West shall have cemented its common defense, and be able to "enter into a relationship to be settled by agreement with the Soviet bloc, a relationship which would offer all those participating security against aggression." President Eisenhower, too, spoke of the growth of Western strength until "there is some diminution of the intractability of the other side's position, and, finally, better chances of negotiations."
All three voices carried the same message : after—but only after—the West has consolidated its strength can it afford to negotiate with Russia. From that strength the West might yet win concessions, made in mutual self-interest, even from an enemy which could never be trusted.