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Ike had hand-picked Patton because "for certain types of action [he] was the outstanding soldier our country has produced ..." Patton knew that Ike had saved his hide more than once, wrote to him after the famous soldier-slapping incident: "I am at a loss to find words with which to express my chagrin and grief at having given you, a man to whom I owe everything and for whom I would gladly lay down my life, cause to be displeased with me."
Montgomery remained a gadfly to the end of the war. Eisenhower had great regard for him as a "set piece" tactician, credits him with having predicted Rommel's tactics in Normandy "to the letter." Monty was always asking for more men, more supplies, wider command, but, says Ike, "General Montgomery was acquainted only with the situation in his own sector . . . He deliberately pursued certain eccentricities of behavior, one of which was to separate himself habitually from his staff ... He consistently refused to deal with a staff officer from any headquarters other than his own . . ." Like Patton, Monty frankly admitted his debt to Ike: "I know my own faults very well and I do not suppose I am an easy subordinate; I like to go my own way. But you have kept me on the rails in difficult and stormy times, and have taught me much."
"Predicted Catastrophes." Eisenhower leaves something still to be said about the Battle of the Bulge. He spread his forces thin, he says, and accepted the calculated risk of a German attack so that the troops and supplies released could be used in attacks elsewhere. Yet he admits that intelligence reports had shown a German buildup there, and that nothing was done to offset it. Ike's own explanation seems a little lame: "This type of report is always coming from one portion or another of a front. The commander who took counsel only of all the gloomy intelligence estimates would never win a battle; he would forever be sitting, fearfully waiting for the predicted catastrophes."
But if someone must take the rap, Eisenhower is willing: "[My] plan gave the German opportunity to launch his attack against a weak portion of our lines. If giving him that chance is to be condemned by historians, their condemnation should be directed at me alone."
Eisenhower also takes the blame for his obvious errors in the Tunisian campaign, but makes out a good case for his temporary collaboration with Darlan. Not only was he bound by political directives that the French in North Africa were to be treated as neutrals, not enemies, but Robert Murphy's intelligence for the U.S. State Department on General Henri Giraud proved faulty. A great deal of effort went into prying Giraud out of Vichy territory, only to have him insist on having Ike's job or none at all. Finally Giraud changed his mind.