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So That F.D.R. Could Sleep. Sherwood makes it clear that there was but one unanimous choice for Supreme Commander of the invasion: George Marshall. It was F.D.R. who, first supporting Marshall, changed his mind. He then overrode Stalin and Churchill to name Eisenhower. Roosevelt explained his change of mind to Marshall : "I could not sleep at night with you out of the country." At the time, the country would undoubtedly have slept better had F.D.R. made what seemed the stronger choice.
One incident alone illustrates Hopkins' enormous influence. On Oct. 3, 1944, Roosevelt had cabled Churchill implying that he (Churchill) could speak for the U.S. on Balkan affairs when he next saw Stalin. F.D.R. had written a cable to Stalin to the same effect; when Hopkins heard about it he ordered the White House map room to stop the Stalin cable. The cable officers obeyed without question. Then Hopkins went to F.D.R.'s bedroom, where the President was shaving, told him what he had done, and persuaded him that the U.S. should always speak for itself. Roosevelt admitted that he had made a serious mistake, and took it all back.
Biographer Sherwood clearly agrees with the Yank estimate of F.D.R.: "He was the Commander in Chief, not only of our armed forces, but of our generation." It is also Sherwood's contention, and he does much to document it, that in the war years Harry Hopkins used his vast, F.D.R.-given power wisely. Later historians may question the wisdom, but they will not be able to question the power. Nor will any historian of the Roosevelt era be able to ignore this book.