In the first week of Allied victory, the Allied world dared to name its fear. The London Economist, long a bulwark of Anglo-Russian friendship, publicly examined the alternatives to a break with the Soviet Union. Ely Culbertson, a U.S.
bridge expert who considers bridge his hobby and international psychology his business, said in his latest plan for world security: "War between the United States and Russia would be the catastrophe of centuries." The wiser diplomats at San Francisco understood the United Nations conference for what it mainly was: an attempt to devise a system wherein the Soviet Union and the western nations could live peaceably together.
It was also a week when conflict was farthest from the common will of com mon men. Plain Russians in Moscow, bursting with good will, impartially hoist ed British and Russian soldiers and car ried them through Red Square. U.S. sol diers and correspondents in Germany found only the warmest friendliness when they managed to break past official barriers and meet Russian soldiers. Hundreds upon hundreds of letters came every day to the U.S. delegates at San Francisco, saying that the conference must find a way to peace. Ordinary Britons and Americans wanted as never before to under stand Russia, and found it harder than ever to do so. Sadly, they were dis covering that victory in Europe had done nothing to lessen the tensions among the victors.
Spheres in the Wasteland. Conquered Germany was sure to be a troublesome prize. The Germans themselves were doing all in their power to make it so (see The Occupation). But the conquerors hardly needed the Germans' assistance. The plan of occupation was enough.
That plan divided Germany into four parts, under four occupation governments: Russia in Berlin and the East (less the Silesian and East Prussian areas to be given to the Soviet Union's new Poland) ; the U.S. in Bavaria, in the South; Britain in a central and western area including Leipzig, Dusseldorf, and the ports of Bremen and Hamburg on the strategic North Sea coastline ; France in the Rhineland (all of the areas were still to be defined exactly).
The theory of occupation was that an Allied commission representing all four powers could treat Germany as one country under one government. On paper, the arrangement was perfect: General Eisen hower for the U.S., and Russian, British and French members yet to be named would clear all common questions, send common directives to the four sub-govern ments. The first purpose of this technically coordinated quartering was to keep Germany impotent. Wisely applied by powers solely devoted to that aim, it might achieve the purpose. But defeated Germany was something more than a nation to be held down: it was also a focal area in the never-ending contest for power in Europe, and the world.*