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Whose Fault? Why replacements and reinforcements had been so long in arriving was one of the questions which went unanswered last week. The 6,000,-mile supply line from the U.S. may have been one answer. Other questions:
Was the Solomons campaign one more example of the still-divided U.S. command in the Pacific? (General MacArthur is responsible for attacking Rabaul; Vice Admiral Ghormley for Guadalcanal, 700 miles to the south.)
Had the Navy planned the campaign without taking U.S. world strategy and the demands of other war theaters into sufficient account?
Had the strategists counted on having to maintain a continuous offensive, once the invasion began? Or had unforeseen events upset careful plans for just such an offensive? It might have been expected that the Japs at their nearby bases would give the U.S. forces no rest, once the Solomons were invaded. Had the Navy expected to draw the Japs into another Midway, instead of the dispersal and infiltration by sea which the Japanese actually practiced? Said Admiral Ernest J. King, in explaining the Solomons invasion last August: "Considerable losses, such as are inherent in any offensive operation, must be expected as the price to be paid for the hard-won experience which is essential to . . . far-reaching results."
Why was Army cooperation so long delayed? Air Forces Lieut. General Henry H. Arnold made a hurried trip to the South Pacific late in September, seven weeks after the invasion began. The arrival of ground forces was announced last week.
There were questions to be answered, lessons to be learned from the Solomons.