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>On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and Navy attended social functions at various points on the Island of Oahu. The Commanding General and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet were both guests at dinners away from their posts but returned to their quarters at an early hour. . . . There is no evidence of excessive drinking by any officer of either service.
>On the morning of Sunday, December 7, Army posts and Naval vessels and stations were adequately manned by men fit for duty.
>In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the prohibited areas off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a.m. Between 6:33 and 6:45 this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U.S.S. Ward. A report of this action by the Ward reached the Naval Base watch officer at 7:12 a.m., who notified his Chief of Staff.
> December 7, the antitorpedo net at Pearl Harbor was opened at 4:58 a.m. for the entrance of two minesweepers. It was kept open until 8:40 a.m.
>The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the attack required them to be ready for flight only after four hours' notice. ^The aircraft warning system, which was remanned about 8:30 a.m., December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to furnish any reliable information of enemy aircraft returning to their carriers.
>During a period of ten days preceding the Japanese attack, the responsible commanders held no ... discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them. The attitude of each demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.