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Submarines. With a great stack of documents drawn chiefly from the secret files of the State Department at his elbow, Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri set out to destroy the submarine theory of U. S. entry into the war by proving that only the pro-Ally bias of President Wilson and Secretary Lansing kept them from eliminating that irritant early in the war. In 1915 Great Britain and the U. S. demanded that German submarines cease surprise attacks on merchant ships, conform to the international law of visit & search. On Jan. 2. 1916 Secretary Lansing addressed to President Wilson a "personal and private" letter. Excerpt: "The chief difficulty with the situation seems to me to lie in this: If some merchant vessels carry arms and others do not, how can a submarine determine this fact without exposing itself to great risk of being sunk? Unless the Entente Allies positively agree not to arm any of their merchant vessels and notify the Central Powers to that effect, is there not strong reason why a submarine should not warn a vessel before launching an attack? "You will recall the case of the Baralong, where a German submarine was bombarding a vessel from which the crew had escaped in boats when a tramp steamer approached flying the American flag. The submarine remained on the surface and awaited the steamer, which on nearing the submarine lowered the American flag, hoisted the British colors, and with a gun mounted on the stern (a defensive armament, according to our early definition) opened fire and sank the German vessel, killing all the crew."
Secretary Lansing proposed that the U. S. reverse its stand, urge the Allies to disarm their merchant vessels in return for a German promise to visit & search. Eight days later President Wilson approved the plan as "reasonable and thorouhgly worth trying." Secretary Lansing drafted a letter to British Ambassador Spring-Rice, sent it to the President with another note :
"My first inclination was to send letters to the German Ambassador and the Austrian Charge, but two reasons prevented: First, I was convinced that the German and Austrian Governments would assent to the proposal . . . and second, if Germany and Austria acceded promptly to the suggestion, any demur by Great Britain, France, Italy or Belgium would, if it became known . . . arouse adverse criticism in the Press of this country and excite resentment against the Entente powers, which seems to be increasing from day to day."