Nation: THE PROSPECTS FOR DISENGAGEMENT

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As a consequence, Nixon feels, US troops can be withdrawn from Viet Nam unilaterally only to the extent that the pull-out does not appreciably reduce the allies' ability to fight the war If forces are removed faster than the South Vietnamese can effectively replace them, then Hanoi and the N L.F need only wait until the allied military position is so weak that Washington and Saigon must accept Communist terms. Diplomatically, everything depends upon convincing Hanoi and the N.L.F. that the US. cutback reflects confidence rather than a slow collapse of will.

No Sign of Progress

If the North Vietnamese reciprocate the troop withdrawals, the U.S. can remove its forces at a faster rate without upsetting the military and thus the bargaining equation. When he returned to Washington last week, the President addressed a challenge to Hanoi "We have opened wide the door to peace, and now we invite the leaders of North Viet Nam to walk with us through that door either by withdrawing their forces from South Viet Nam as we have withdrawn ours, or by negotiating in Pans, or through both avenues. We believe this is the time for them to act."

The immediate response was hardly encouraging. North Vietnamese troops launched three sharp ground attacks and for the first time in three months there was fighting in the demilitarized zone. The superficial signs in Paris were, if anything, worse. After the 21st formal meeting in the year-old negotiations, U.S. Spokesman Harold Kaplan admitted: "There is no evidence that Midway has contributed to the progress of the conference,"

North Vietnamese rhetoric often varies from real intentions, of course, but in an interview with TIME-LIFE, Le Due Tho, a Politburo member and special adviser to Chief Negotiator Xuan Thuy, squelched—at least for the record —the idea that North Viet Nam might match the US. move. "Since U.S. troop strength in South Viet Nam amounts to over half a million," said Tho, "the withdrawal of such a very small number as 25,000 means nothing." Tho offered a gentle reproof to Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. negotiators. Said Tho: "Talking to me, Mr, Lodge said that it took him five years to understand the Vietnamese. But I don't think he has fully understood. It takes time."

Old Wine, New Bottle

The N.L.F. also took the occasion last week to announce that it had set up a "provisional revolutionary government" at a clandestine meeting that took place as Nixon and Thieu were conferring on Midway. At its head is Huyn Tan Phat, 56, an architect and Viet Minh veteran who is general secretary of the N.L.F. central committee; the defense minister is Lieut. General Tran Van Tra, a North Vietnamese who is the Communist army commander in South Viet Nam; the foreign minister is Madame Nguyen Thi Bmh, already a familiar figure at the Paris negotiations. Madame Binh celebrated her new eminence by proclaiming the goal of "complete victory" over Saigon and Washington.

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