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Exempted from the roundup were the country's power-hungry Buddhist monks, who for a month had been fighting to topple Huong. At the Saigon central pagoda, where 6,000 Buddhists had gathered, a visibly subdued Thich Tarn Chau, head of the Buddhist political bureau, announced: "For the time being, just pray and go home."
Test of Wills. Taken completely by surprise, U.S. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson met four representatives of the Armed Forces Council-Thi, Ky, Navy Commander Vice Admiral Chung Tan Gang, and Brigadier General Nguyen Van Thieu, commander of the southernmost IV Corps. Gist of Gen eral Taylor's position: the High National Council had provided at least a semblance of representative government; if the military did not hand the reins back to the Council or some civilian body, there would be cuts in promised U.S. aid, and the still-vague plans to interdict Viet Cong supply lines in Laos might be dropped.
The four officers listened, but went ahead and called a press conference, at which they insisted that the High National Council had been dissolved in the national interest and would stay dissolved-although they proclaimed continued support for Chief of State Suu and Premier Tran Van Huong.
Then began a stubborn test of wills between the U.S. embassy and the generals. The U.S. was banking on the fact that only continued American aid could help the generals survive, let alone win, the war against the Viet Cong; the generals were banking on the belief that the U.S. need to keep the war going was even more desperate than theirs.
Stinging Thrust. After two days Khanh revealed his support of the Young Turks. He also condemned the High National Council and asserted the army's right to intervene in government affairs whenever "disputes and differences create a situation favorable to the common enemies: Communism and colonialism." As for the U.S., he had a stinging thrust: "We make sacrifices for the country's independence and the people's liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country."
There were two factors (at least) behind Khanh's new nationalist. anti-American line. For one thing, he was trying to outdistance the Buddhists in that department, and apparently succeeding. For another, there was growing personal hostility between Khanh and Maxwell Taylor. Senior Americans in Saigon hinted strongly that Khanh must quit. When Khanh asked if it would be helpful for him to leave the country, Taylor reportedly replied with a flat yes. Moreover, one American complaint suddenly heard in Saigon was that Khanh had no principles-a naive, belated and irrelevant discovery.
In an interview with New York Herald Tribune Correspondent Beverly Deepe, Khanh zeroed in on Taylor. "His attitude during the last 48 hours-as far as my small head is concerned -has been beyond imagination," said Khanh. "If General Taylor does not act more intelligently, the U.S. will lose Southeast Asia and we will lose our freedom." The U.S., said Khanh, must "work with the decisive elements in the nation," meaning the army. "You must be more realistic and not have a dream of having Viet Nam be an image of the United States."