The War: The Organization Man

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outpost gate or other attack point. The men are then run through practice assaults over and over again until they know exactly where they must go in the dark, with split-second timing. The U.S. also spurred Hanoi to modernize the Viet Cong weaponry. Mortars, once a rarity, are now abundant in V.C. units, as are the Soviet-made rockets that were used in three recent attacks on Danang Airbase. Though perhaps as much as a fourth of the V.C.'s hand weapons remain old U.S. issue, captured or stolen, more and more of the V.C. troops are being equipped with modern Chinese assault guns.

For Viet Cong who distinguish themselves in combat, a military Liberation Medal, first, second or third class, is the reward. But in a people's army, officers may not bestow a decoration on a man unless his comrades in battle agree that he deserves it. More often, a good soldier is simply commended publicly, and perhaps given a title—"Determined to Win Soldier" or "Valiant Killer of Americans."

Until 1964, the Viet Cong ranks were entirely volunteer; conscripts were disdained as utterly untrustworthy. Then, on the brink of victory and needing extra manpower for the final push, the Viet Cong began drafting men. Today, conscription is one of the Viet Cong's most serious problems, required not for victory but simply to replace the lengthening roster of casualties. Viet Cong troopers are paid only from 300 to 500 per month, v. a government recruit's pay of $27 per month, and few youths in V.C. areas volunteer any more. Instead, they are given an ultimate choice: join or be shot on the spot—a factor that undoubtedly contributes to the record 20,000 Viet Cong defectors so far this year.

Even so, the Viet Cong recruiters have their standards. Any man under 4 ft. 10 in. is rejected, as are those with kinfolk fighting for the government, those with such ailments as stomach trouble, tuberculosis, asthma or an amputated trigger finger. To avoid infiltration by government spies, one captured document enjoined against recruiting former ARVN volunteers, Roman Catholics, and "those young men whose father or mother were killed by the Revolution, landlords' sons, and those whose parents, brothers and sisters were tyrants, opponents and distributors of the Revolution."

Tactics of Terror. Fighting other soldiers is only one use that the Viet Cong find for their weapons. Just as often, knives, guns and bombs are employed on civilians in calculated acts of intimidation. The Viet Cong have made a veritable science out of what 19th century anarchists called "the propaganda of the deed": terrorism.

The sniper's bullet, the machine-gun burst in the night, a bus full of farmers dynamited, the satchel of plastique, the grenade tossed into a crowd—all are surgically planned by the Viet Cong to specific ends. In the countryside, terrorism often aims to stamp out the peasants' sense of security, always tenuous at best. A few guerrillas firing a dozen shots near a lightly defended government village pose an agonizing problem for the local commander. If he calls for reinforcements, it is almost certain that no enemy will be found. If he does not, the villagers may begin to wonder whether the government really means to protect them.

Often, murdering the village elder or headman deprives the peasants of