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Johnson has also been under pressure to ease rigid proscriptions that have spared many of North Viet Nam's most inviting targets from U.S. air attack. Target selection has been one of the most controversial questions of the war since regular U.S. bombing of the north began on Feb. 7, 1965. The Administration's goal, restated yet again last week by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, is to reduce enemy infiltration but not to "invade, conquer or destroy" North Viet Nam or to "risk widening the war, with all that implies." Yet the movement of men and munitions continues; despite 1,000,000 tons of bombs dropped so far in what the Pentagon has code-named Rolling Thunder, Communist forces in the South are better equipped than ever.
Pulled Punches? Military commanders and some members of Congress would like to "dry up" Haiphong as a usable port with bombs, mines, or both, to knock out canal locks, industrial plants, military command headquarters in Hanoi, as well as major MIG bases and rail lines and roads in regions that have been on the prohibited list. According to one expert, only 50% of the approximately 225 targets identified by the military have been open to attack.
Last week demands for wider air strikes reached a new crescendo on Capitol Hill. Republican House Leader Gerald Ford demanded: "Why are we still pulling our air-power punch?" Until the limitations are lifted, Ford said, he sees "no justification for sending one more American" to Viet Nam. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee heard testimony from Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific. Although the hearing was closed, it was no secret that Sharp had unreservedly argued the case for intensified bombing. Subcommittee Chairman John Stennis commented: "I've never said we ought to step up the bombing or get out, but that is the way I feel now." Present bombing tactics, he warned, mean the war could go on "for years to come." At week's end, the Air Force was allowed for the first time to hit a key bridge near the center of Hanoi (see THE WORLD), and the Administration was beginning to approve other targets that had previously been off limits.
Allied View. Regardless of the pressure, Johnson is unlikely to make any radical or hasty decisions. The most obvious inhibitions are the risks of en couraging Chinese intervention in Viet Nam and of hardening further the Soviet Union's position. Thus, if Johnson decides to make a land assault on the southernmost portion of North Viet Nam, it is likely to be limited in scope and duration—and to be so labeled in advance. While wider bombing is in prospect, it is doubtful that the President would sanction the obliteration of Haiphong, since Soviet ships would be in the line of fire.