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What did support for the Moratorium mean? Did it mean backing unconditional withdrawal from Viet Nam? Many of the Moratorium's supporters favored it, but many more did not. Almost certainly the majority of the nation as a whole was not prepared for that step at present.
Within the diversity of M-day protest was one unifying factor: exhaustion of patience with the war, doubt about the pace of Richard Nixon's efforts to end it. Some participants had specific ideas on how to end the war. A five-point proposal came last week from Yale's President Kingman Brewster Jr. and New Haven Mayor Richard Lee, who jointly called for an immediate cease-fire followed within twelve months by withdrawal of all U.S. forces; elections supervised by "a coalition body" dominated by neither side; aid to any South Vietnamese wishing to leave his country; and U.S. economic assistance for rebuilding Viet Nam.
Other protesters, however, were merely obeying their emotions, without any concrete idea of what they wanted the U.S. to do. They would agree with Mrs. Eleanor Bockman, a middle-aged Atlanta housewife: "I think people are thoroughly tired of the war. I think that some middle-class whites are just beginning to realize the depth of poverty in this country. Older people see the emptiness, the burden of the war. Younger people see it as a great waste of talent and life. Everybody knows that there is no answer now to the Viet Nam war, but we've got to let Nixon know."
The M-day movement has been getting bigger partly because its leaders — who happily confessed that the Moratorium had begun to run them, not they the Moratorium — cast as wide a net as possible. They appealed to al most anyone unhappy with the war, shunning extremists and avoiding ideo logical factionalism. The absence of New Left infighting and cant was refreshing.
One Columbia student confessed: "It will be nice to go to a demonstration without having to swear allegiance to Chairman Mao."
An Element of Coercion
One large segment of M-day support comes from those who worked for Mc Carthy or Robert Kennedy last year be cause of their opposition to the war.
But there were significant differences.
For one thing, Lyndon Johnson's down fall showed once again how an en trenched President could be defeated over a deeply emotional issue. For another, Richard Nixon's own obvious determination to end the war, regardless of his timetable, had made opposition to the war far more respectable. To many people, the argument is no longer really over victory or defeat, patriotism or dishonor, but rather over when the U.S. withdraws and what concessions, if any, it can get in return. Timing, of course, could make a major difference to the U.S.'s future position in Asia — but it is not a difference for which many people are eager to sacrifice lives or money.