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Reading Others' Radar. If there had been some question at the outset whether the Pueblo might have violated North Korean waters, there was no such doubt about the EC-121. Its crew had orders to stay at least 50 nautical miles off the North Korean coast. Some wreckage from the aircraft turned up 85 miles at sea. Nixon insisted that American, Russian and North Korean radar had all shown the EC-121 clearly over international waters. His remark revealed for the first time that the U.S. has electronic gadgets that can read what other nations' radars are reporting.
In a gesture of cooperation indicating that the Russians had no intention of supporting the North Korean claim of intrusion, two Soviet destroyers on patrol in the South China Sea joined U.S. air and sea search efforts for the missing EC-121. Later the U.S. destroyer Tucker, carrying the only two bodies recovered, obtained from the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovenie pieces of the downed aircraft that the Russians had collected. President Nixon said the U.S. was "most grateful" for the Russian help, but there were ironies on both sides. The Russians were presumably interested in having a look at any pieces of the downed plane's electronic gear that they could turn up. The U.S. spy planes often fly along the Soviet littoral near Vladivostok during their rounds of the Sea of Japan. Russia, as well as North Korea, may be a target for their inquisitive electronic ears (see box opposite).
Above Oratory. If the Russians seemed particularly helpful, it was perhaps because they themselves were growing leary of the erratic North Korean Communists. Even so, the Soviets may benefit from North Korea's attack on the U.S. plane. Japan's Premier Eisaku Sato took an unusually forthright pro-U.S. position after the EC-121 went down, but Japan's citizenry has become increasingly edgy about the risks attendant on playing host to the U.S. military. Moscow—as well as Peking and Pyongyang—would like to see American strength reduced in the far Pacific. With the U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty open to renegotiation next year, Sato's position is extremely delicate.
So is Richard Nixon's. He was widely reminded last week of his campaign rhetoric denouncing the Johnson Administration for having allowed Pueblo to be seized by "a fourth-rate military power like North Korea"; in the campaign, Nixon had said that "what we can do is not let this happen again." Nonetheless, confronted with a recurrence, he managed to rise above summer oratory and ensure that there was, in fact, less tension generated this time than by the Pueblo incident. Lyndon Johnson mobilized 14,787 reserves last year and managed to create a crisis atmosphere with no immediate result. Nixon, who had built much of his reputation on militant antiCommunism, kept his response to the minimum consistent with national honor and domestic politics. As Secretary of State Rogers acknowledged, great power—and responsibility—often imposes narrow limits on national choice.