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Mistaken Estimates
Miscalculations of the rival's intentions are common. In 1960, there was fear of a "missile gap." In 1965, the U.S. concluded that the Russians had given up quantitative arms competition, only to see them spurt forward later. And before leaving office, McNamara acknowledged that, overall, the U.S. had spent too much on weaponry during his tenure because of mistaken estimates of Russian intentions. However, the Russians have accelerated their buildup, tripling their supply of land-based missiles in little more than two years. The U.S. remains ahead in overall nuclear-delivery capability, but Russia continues to close the gap.
As for ABM, the Russians have a lead in deployment if not in technology. They have installed a thicket of one-or two-megaton Galosh missiles—perhaps 75—around Moscow after giving up on an earlier defense ring in the Leningrad area, presumably because of obsolescence. Although no one can be sure of its intent, the Kremlin has reportedly planned a $25 billion program that would buy more than 5,000 Galoshes. U.S. intelligence has assumed that Galosh is an inferior missile supported by relatively old-fashioned mechanical radars and hence of no major concern to the West at present. Recently, though, Defense Secretary Laird has indicated that the Russians are working on new components. German military sources talk of a Russian ABM in the 50-to 60-megaton range.
Despite their heavy military budgets in recent years, Russian leaders, like their American counterparts, have good reason to hope for an arms slowdown. Soviet defense expenditures cannot be precisely audited because they are largely hidden. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that Moscow's recent defense spending has been roughly equivalent to Washington's military budget (after the $30-billion-a-year cost of Viet Nam is subtracted from the U.S. figure). Yet the Russian gross national product is only about half of the American G.N.P.
This, together with the fact that the Russians have managed to catch up somewhat in the arms race, may explain Moscow's present willingness to bargain for some form of arms limitation. Another element is that, in the absence of any agreement, both sides might soon consider it necessary to press ahead with new generations of expensive weapons, both offensive and defensive.
How does ABM enter into that equation? Again, there is wide disagreement. Says Kentucky Senator John Sherman Cooper: "This is a moment when negotiations are possible, a moment that should not be lost." George Rathjens, a former disarmament agency official now at M.I.T., argues that the simultaneous deployment of ABMs and MIRVs would destabilize the present equation by increasing the temptation to make a first, or preemptive, strike. The Administration has argued that the ABM could be a bargaining counter with the Soviets. "We must have both offensive and defensive missiles up