Foreign Relations: The Meat of the Matter

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Appearances are deceiving. Last week well-publicized proposals for negotiations leading to a U.S. withdrawal from South Viet Nam inspired an international supposition that the U.S. would actually succumb to such pressure. But President Lyndon Johnson, without saying a public word on the subject, was more determined than ever to remain in Viet Nam—and, thread by thread, to tighten the screw against the Communist aggressors.

The talk -it -over -and -then -get -out proposals to the U.S. (no one ever seems to suggest that the North Vietnamese get out of South Viet Nam) came from two major sources:

> Moscow, which sent its ambassador to France a memorandum for delivery to Charles de Gaulle. Its gist: Russia, France, and all other peace-loving nations who were signatories to the 1954 Geneva pact that split up French Indo-China, should sit down at a table, neutralize South Viet Nam, and require the U.S. to depart the premises. The idea was right in line with De Gaulle's own thinking, and his government promptly agreed to support such a conference.

> Burma's U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who announced that he had been "conducting private discussions" with various nations involved in the Viet Nam conflict and had made "concrete" proposals that he could not publicly divulge. Still, he felt certain that the American people, "if only they knew the true facts"—presumably, there are "untrue" facts in Burma—would agree with him "that further bloodshed is unnecessary."

Once & for All. When President Johnson heard of U Thant's statements, he went through the roof. Among other things, he authorized White House Press Secretary George Reedy to declare emphatically: "There are no authorized negotiations under way with Mr. Thant or any other government." In fact, said Reedy, the U.S. has yet to receive from any source any "meaningful" proposal for negotiations. The President also authorized Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to issue a "white paper" aimed at proving once and for all the extent of North Vietnamese aggression in South Viet Nam (see THE WORLD).

More than anything else, the President worked behind the scenes in rounding up support for his position. He dealt first with the Washington press corps, which has been hostile to him lately (see THE PRESS). Individually or in small groups, he summoned journalists who had been clamoring against his policy, and the results of his persuasive efforts were swiftly evidenced in print. He also re-recruited former U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Speaking in Denver, Lodge said: "None of the countries now urging us to negotiate would consider negotiations for themselves if they were in our situation." Next day Johnson announced that he was assigning Lodge to consult with him on the entire Vietnamese situation.

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