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There is, however, a serious problem that Kennan has not yet attempted to resolve. His opposition to the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam grows out of his belief that Peking does not now pose a threat to U.S. interests. Yet he concedes that China, under a firm, unifying hand and armed with nuclear weapons, may one day join the five existing "vital" areas as a formidable sixth. It would thus automatically become of prime concern to the U.S. to contain a Communist-ruled China. How to do it is another question, and Kennan has no ready answer. He simply does not think that South Viet Nam was the best place to begin.
Kennan hopes to write a second volume that will cover his tours of duty as U.S. Ambassador to Moscow in 1952 and to Tito's Yugoslavia from 1961 to 1963. In it, perhaps, he will suggest how to come to grips with the problem of China in a period when the approaches of the cold war are no longer adequate, but new ones have yet to be fashioned. Kennan's record makes it certain that he will be heard.