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The Washington visit also managed to quell some of the voices from the Philippine left, which argues against further U.S. involvement in the Philippines. Marcos won a pledge from the U.S. to cut its lease on bases (Clark Field and Subic Bay) from 99 years to only another 25. The complex demands of parity and tariff arrangements set up by the Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement have provoked dissension among Filipinos and Americans engaged in developing the country: Marcos reached one of the first accommodations on that thorny issue in a decade. Lyndon Johnson agreed to open negotiations for a new trade instrument that would ease both Filipino fears and American appetites.
As for the Huks, who remain in small but noisy numbers around the U.S. bases and in the ricelands of central Luzon, Marcos ignores them. He is more concerned with such Red-backed outfits as Masaka (Free Federation of Farmers), which provoke vociferous demonstrations and pose a long-range threat to the government. Of the thousands of armed Huks who once terrorized the islands, only a few hundred remain. Bandits with a profit motive, on the other hand, still thrive. Pirates roam at will through the Sibuyan Sea and even in Manila Bay itself. The U.S. promise to equip ten Filipino battalions (at a cost of $20 million) may help to cut bandit operations over the next two years—or so Marcos hopes.
"It's All There." The U.S. is more than willing to back the Philippines' new leader. "In less than a year," says one White House authority, "he did well enough for us to decide that it was worthwhile to underwrite him a little more." By sending a brigade to Viet Nam (albeit in a "noncombat" role), Marcos lost a lot of support from anti-American critics whose nationalism he had hoped to convert to political power. He did not get the $250 million stabilization loan he had hoped for to back the peso (which Washington considers stable enough); he did, however, get the Manila Conference, which should win him both regional recognition and a great deal of popular support at home.
No one in Washington considers Marcos a lackey; indeed his words before the cheering throngs at Manila airport on his return from Washington still ring clear in State Department ears. "America must realize," he said, "there are conditions she must accept in Asia. The first is a diversity of Asian cultures, governments, economic and political systems; the second, that to run against the tide of Asian nationalism is worse than impractical—it is also highly dangerous."
In a nation that never had to win its independence by force of arms, there is a perennial need for heroes. With his unmatched war record, his dazzling political success, and his stern insistence on an Asian solution to Asian problems, Marcos—with luck—could meet that need. "It's all there," says a Washington admirer. Whether the full potential is ever realized depends on Marcos.
* His predecessors: Manuel Roxas (1946-48), Elpidio Quirino (1948-53), Ramon Magsaysay (1953-57), Carlos Garcia (1957-62), Diosdado Macapagal (1962-65). * The Asian and Pacific Council, whose members are Australia, Formosa, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and South Viet Nam.