(4 of 10)
Why did the President spare Ho Chi Minh's biggest oil pool for so long? Plans for POL strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area have been actively advanced ever since Johnson's Christmastide pause in the air war proved that Hanoi was interested not in the conference table but in conquest. As in most of his major decisions, the case for bombing Hanoi-Haiphong had to be repeatedly presented, chewed over, rehashed and represented before Johnson made his final determination. The strongest argument for the raids, of course, was the ever-rising Communist infiltration rate along a route that military men, not exactly in jest, now call the "Ho Chi Minh boulevard." The President's top advisers were of two minds on the question, with Secretary of State Dean Rusk tentatively doubtful of the raids' worth but ultimately persuaded that they were militarily essential. McNamara himself was skeptical of their value until mid-June, fearing that they might prove excessively costly in U.S. aircraft losses.
The Clincher. The final decision was undoubtedly nudged by the polls, which have indicated rising unease over the war. Johnson was anxious to demonstrate anew to domestic critics and foreign doubters that the U.S. is determined to honor its commitment in Viet Nam. He was also impatient for some tangible evidence of victory before November's congressional elections.
But the President's reasons went deeper than politics. About a month ago, his inner clock began telling him that the time had come to press the allied military advantage to the hilt. One reason, as Under Secretary of State George Ball testified last week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is that there are telling signs of "weakening morale" in North Viet Nam. The clincher was inevitable: with American casualties running close to 1,000 a month, no responsible commander could indefinitely overlook the enemy's logistical base.
Naturally, the Administration decided that it would be imprudent to take any dramatic action until the political unrest in Saigon subsided. Then, on June 18, the President clearly signaled his intentions by telling a Saturday news conference in the oval office that "we must continue to raise the cost of aggression at its source." The raids were scheduled for the subsequent Friday—only to be delayed by weather and the Pentagon's insistence that perfect visibility was an essential safeguard against accidental bombing of residential areas. Then, on Saturday, the attack was postponed again by a news leak, whose significance for a time seemed to overshadow the event itself in much of the reporting from Washington. Finally the mission was reset for last Wednesday.
Immense Pains. Seldom has a military operation been more meticulously prepared. It was fitted into a time when no Russian tankers would be visiting Haiphong. Allied governments with troops in Viet Nam were consulted, other allies advised. Above all, immense pains were taken to avoid civilian casualties. Pilots, hand-picked for their bombing prowess and knowledge of the terrain, studied hundreds of photographs and maps of the assigned areas—and were sternly warned to scrub their bombing runs if they had any doubts about hitting the assigned target. Said one base commander: "We wanted the first team in."