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"Desperate Surgery." Mecklin's account of the coup and of the murder of Diem and Nhu is colorful but carefully subjective—he reports only what he saw. Although he states categorically that Lodge was intent on getting rid of Diem and that he knew the coup was planned—indeed had spoken with the coup leaders—Mecklin does not charge that the U.S. Mission was directly involved.
Still, the deed was done. Was it justified? Mecklin thinks not. "A coup d'etat in such circumstances," he writes, "was desperate surgery. The odds against success were comparable with, say, a kidney transplant." And indeed the graft didn't take. Diem's successors proved unable to halt the "relentless deterioration, confirming in dreary succession all the black predictions of those who had opposed the coup."
"Unalterable Obligation." The lessons that emerge from Mecklin's account are sad but simple. Highhanded as he was, Diem deserved greater understanding from the U.S. Writes Mecklin: "Just as the U.S. should insist on effective action against a guerrilla enemy, we should rigidly limit our interference to this objective. We should accept almost any extreme of public embarrassment, even at the expense of our 'dignity,' to permit the host government to enjoy the trappings of independence."
Having failed with Diem, the U.S. compounded its error by failing as well in its handling of Diem's successors. The next step was inevitable: "It was a bitter reality that in Viet Nam our central enemies, the Russians and Chinese, once again had found somebody else to fight their battles for them. It was now our unalterable obligation to send our own fighting men to defend our vital interests, just as we had through all our history. There was no cheap way, no easy way out."