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Spain. Three SAC bases. The ten-year agreement between the U.S. and Spain expires in September 1963, but it can be renewed if both countries agree. In deference to Spanish sensibilities, the bases fly the Spanish flag, not the Stars and Stripes.
Portugal. Lajes Field in the Azores, a valuable Air Force refueling base for transatlantic flights, may be lost to the U.S. when the U.S. -Portuguese agreement expires at year's end. Reason: the Portuguese are sore because the U.S. has failed to back their efforts to hold onto their colonies.
Morocco. Three SAC bases, but not for long. Under a 1959 agreement, the U.S. promised to withdraw by the end of 1963. and SAC has already begun shifting planes to bases in Spain. Morocco's neutralist government will probably also insist that the U.S. Navy give up its base at Kenitra, an important communications center for the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Libya. Wheelus Air Base, support and training center for U.S. Air Force units in Europe. The lease agreement runs through 1971.
Japan. Four TAC bases. No SAC bombers, no missiles.
Okinawa. Two TAC bases, including several score F-100 fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs. Also, the Air Force is building launching sites for 1,500-mile Mace B missiles, capable of striking Red China. The U.S. holds its bases under an agreement with Japan that runs until 1970.
South Korea. Two TAC bases with fighter-bombers and fighters. Matador 650-mile, ground-to-ground missiles.
Formosa. Mace and Matador missiles, essentially defensive, but with a capability of reaching Red China across the strait.
The Philippines. TAC.
Guam. SAC. Also Navy facilities.
Canada. Six Air Force bases— two SAC, four ADC. Also, a Navy station at Argentia, Nfld.
Bermuda. Navy station and Air Force refueling facilities.
Puerto Rico. SAC.
Canal Zone. Air Force support bases.
Trinidad. Navy station, useful in World War II but now considered dispensable. No strategic forces.
Cuba. naval base, held by the U.S. under a perpetual lease, negotiated in 1903 and reaffirmed in 1934. It grants the U.S. "complete jurisdiction and control." In the nuclear age, Guantánamo no longer has any great strategic value, but with its excellent anchorage it is a valued warm-water training base— and as long as Castro controls Cuba, the base will have a special value as a free world outpost, a reminder of the U.S.'s proximity and power.