The Presidency: The Durable Doctrine

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the hemisphere than Guatemala could ever have been. It is often argued that the Monroe Doctrine, the product of a simpler time, applies only to old-fashioned aggression. But in his wisdom, Monroe spoke for generations unborn and perils unenvisioned. What he declared to be dangerous to the U.S.'s peace and safety was "any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere . . . interposition in any form." That unmistakably applies to Cuba in 1962.

Just Get It Over With. What could the U.S. do if it decided to act on its own, invoking the Monroe Doctrine?

The choices are difficult and narrowing fast. Just 17 months ago, President Kennedy had a real chance to blast Castro out of power; but at the crucial moment of the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy called off the promised U.S. air cover. Today Castro's Cuba, propped up by Soviet economic and military support, is far more dangerous than it was then. The time is gone when it might be possible for Cuban exiles, no matter how much U.S. support they might get, to reclaim their homeland. And unless Castro launches an open, large-scale military attack against one of his neighbors, there is no prospect that the Organization of American States will undertake decisive action against Castro.

What remains? Some advocates of action call for a U.S. naval blockade to halt shipments of military supplies to Cuba.

But that would involve grave risks (it would mean trying to stop Russian ships on the high seas) without really solving the Castro problem. The only possibility that promises a quick end to Castro—if that is what is wanted—is a direct U.S.

invasion of Cuba, carried out with sufficient force to get the job done with surgical speed and efficiency.

Many Latin American leaders would welcome, either openly or secretly, just such U.S. action against Cuba. Most of Castro's closest Caribbean neighbors—Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic—have quietly informed the U.S. that they would back a U.S. invasion. Says Peru's Victor Andres Belaunde, former President of the U.N. General Assembly: "The presence of Russian troops in Cuba demands decisive action on the part of the U.S. I don't think Latin reaction to the U.S. action against Cuba will be unfavorable."

But the Cuba situation continues to haunt the Kennedy Administration. To Kennedy, personally, it is a bone in the throat. He would like nothing better than to get the whole thing over with, by whatever means. For all his stylish public pronouncements, in private Kennedy is wont to hark back to the Bay of Pigs opportunity and to muse regretfully: "I wonder if . . ."

One Administration argument against direct action to oust Castro is that Khrushchev might retaliate by stirring up trouble in other parts of the world, possibly setting off a thermonuclear war. But if Khrushchev wants such a war, he can start it or set it off any time he wants.

And if—as can be presumed from the record of recent history—he does not want such a war, it is improbable that he would feel compelled to risk thermonuclear destruction to save Castro.

When action is risky and painful, it is always tempting to men and to nations to delay in the hope that it will prove unnecessary.