(5 of 9)
A Knowledge of Fear. Ben-Gurion is a history-minded realist who accepts setbacks rather than permanent defeats. When the greatest powers of East and West alike warned him to pull back his triumphant armies from Sinai last fall, he bowed to necessity and paraphrased to his Parliament Plato's definition of courage as "a special kind of knowledge: the knowledge of how to fear what ought to be feared, and not to fear what ought not to be feared." In reply to Eisenhower's broadcast, Ben-Gurion made an impassioned defense of his reasons for standing out against "the elected leader of the American nation . . . one of the most illustrious men of our generation." But he also quietly dropped his demand that Israel administer Gaza: Israel's main concern was that the Egyptians should not be allowed back "directly or indirectly."
With a stern "Be strong, have courage," the Premier sent Ambassador Eban back to Washington with new instructions. Then, pale and drawn from the effects of pneumonia, after a PT-boat ride two months ago in the Aqaba straits, Ben-Gurion went before his Cabinet to ask new flexibility in his terms. Less than a month before, the Knesset had put through a fire-eating resolution committing Israel never to give up either the gulf or Gaza. A Knesset debate had to be postponed one whole day while Ben-Gurion argued with politicians who insisted on all-out defiance. "The devil with this," growled B-G. "The devil with the coalition." He threatened to quit and form a new government. The Knesset debate that night was dogged ("The noose is tightening round our neck." cried one bearded, skull-capped orator), but Ben-Gurion's threat of resignation at last effected a compromise that gave the Prime Minister the leeway he needed.
Enter the French. Arriving in Washington, Eban informed Dulles that Ben-Gurion was now willing, "more or less," to go along with the U.S. proposal for Aqaba, but wanted some such arrangement for Gaza as Canada's Lester Pearson and Britain's Selwyn Lloyd were working on. This would install U.N. troops in Gaza while creating a U.N. administration of the strip from which both Israelis and Egyptians would be excluded. By this time the Arab-bloc nations had introduced a U.N. resolution calling for sanctions against Israel, and the U.S. had prepared a milder one to the same effect. Dulles suggested that the Israelis take their case to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. Eban failed to make a sale: if Israel expected protection in Aqaba under the 1949 armistice, then the armistice also applied in Gaza, which meant that Egypt had a right to be in Gaza.
At this point, France's Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau arrived in Washington. Out of its long hostilities against Arab rebels in North Africa, France has become Israel's one staunch supporter in the U.N. Pineau submitted to Dulles a draft resolution whereby 1) Israel would withdraw unconditionally, and 2) Israel's rights would be reserved under the Charter's self-defense clause if Egypt should go back to raids and blockades against her.