THE WHITE CASE RECORD: BROWNELL:

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to see the President as soon as possible, outline to him exactly what the situation was, and they would suggest to the President that there were three alternatives:

1) The President could dismiss White, and make no statement.

2) The President could send for White and tell him he had changed his mind and that he desired White to resign and not serve.

3) The President could sign the commission, instruct the Attorney General to continue the investigation vigorously and instruct the Secretary of the Treasury that he, as governor of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems and of the International Bank, should take steps to see that any persons selected for appointment should not be appointed except with approval of the governor . . .

I did not enter into any agreement to shift White from his position in the Treasury Department to the International Monetary Fund. This was not within my purview. I was at the meeting to furnish facts, which I did.

There was no agreement while I was present between the Attorney General and Judge Vinson other than that they should see the President with the Secretary of State and suggest the three alternates mentioned above. I was not present in any discussions with the President concerning this matter.

I was advised on Feb. 26, 1946 by the Attorney General that he had seen the President and that an effort would be made to remove Harry Dexter White, although the Attorney General expressed" doubt that this would work out.

The Attorney General further stated to me on Feb. 26, 1946 that he felt that White would go into the job and then would be surrounded with persons who were especially selected and were not security risks. He further stated that the President was interested in continuing the surveillance.

No FBI Agreement

I might add White had been under surveillance as early as November 1945. I stated if that was the desire, we would continue the investigation.

At no time was the FBI a party to an agreement to promote Harry Dexter White, and at no time did the FBI give its approval to such an agreement. Such an agreement on the part of the FBI would be inconceivable.

If this principle were applied to White, it would, of necessity, have applied to others who had similarly been involved in this particular investigation, who were dismissed from Government service when their subversive activities were discovered. Those dismissals occurred in March 1946, June 14 and 18, 1946, July 1946 and Sept. 25, 1946.

At no time did the FBI interpose objections to such dismissals. No restrictions were placed upon the agencies wherein action was taken. All that we asked was that sources of information be protected.

Had it been the intent of the FBI to handle the Harry Dexter White and other related cases solely as an intelligence operation, the widespread dissemination of information that was furnished to various branches of the Government by the FBI would not have been undertaken . . .

The decision to retain White was made by a higher Government authority. Obviously, if a higher authority elected to shift a man rather than fire him if he was suspect, then it would go without saying that the FBI would continue our investigation as best we could.

If in fact there was any agreement to move White from the Treasury