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"Order That Man." At India's request, the U.S. warned Syngman Rhee against breaking the peace at Indian Village, as South Korea had threatened. The U.N. command pulled back South Korean marines from positions where they could have helped a breakout, and replaced them with U.S. marines.
But India's Nehru, who apparently believes that the U.N. holds the anti-Communist P.W.s under some form of duress, was not convinced at all. "Recent developments," he said in faraway Bombay, "have made me wonder if the U.S. is serious about an armistice . . . One has the suspicion that an attempt is being made, certainly by the South Korean government, to prevent the commission from functioning."
Then Nehru announced his support for one major Communist position, to wit, that there should be "90 clear days" for explanations—90 days after the construction of explanation huts, not 90 days after the transfer of P.W.s to Indian custody, as the armistice specifically ruled. In New Delhi, one of Nehru's senior aides also suggested that the U.S. do more to curb its ally, President Rhee. "What we want," he said, "is an unambiguous statement that the South Koreans are in the wrong and will be kept under control . . . It is for the U.S. to order that man."
Names & Addresses. The U.N. position has been further compromised by a monumental U.N. blunder. The U.N. had apparently handed the Indian custodial force a complete list, in English and Chinese, not only of the names, ranks and serial numbers of the P.W.s (which is all they were required to do), but of their parents and home-town addresses as well. If this list passes from the Indian guards to the Polish and Czech members of the commission, the U.N.'s basic principle of "no forced repatriation" will look sick indeed: the Communists could simply tell the P.W.s, via explainers or the camp grapevine, to return home or accept reprisals against their families.