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On March 20, the J.C.S. forwarded a memo informing MacArthur that the President was planning an announcement that, with South Korea cleared of aggressors, the U.N. was willing to talk of negotiations. Before anyone in Washington knew what was up, MacArthur had flown to Korea and offered to meet the enemy commander to arrange a cease-fire in the field. MacArthur added an implied threat: "The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse."
Harry Truman dispatched a sharp reminder again demanding silence, and smoldered when he was told later in the week of a British correspondent's report of a conversation with MacArthur: "He said that it was not the soldier who had encroached on the realm of the politician, it was the politician who had encroached on that of the soldier." Then came the Martin letter, addressed to a member of the political opposition, with its observation: "It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here ... we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words."
The Explanation. A few days later, over the morning coffee, the nation read of Harry Truman's reply and fumed. That night, Truman took to the air with an explanation. "I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea ... A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy . . .
"You may ask: Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist the Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China? . . . What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China? . . .
"The Communist side must now choose its course of action . . . They may take further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow . . . We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war—not to start one."
Douglas MacArthur believed that "here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest," and that the battle might be lost before Harry Truman decided it had begun. Harry Truman, as the first of 18,000 telegrams and 50,000 letters poured in, knew that he faced the biggest political storm of his stormy political career.
* Truman's order stripped MacArthur of four commands—Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces in Korea; Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Japan; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East. But as a five-star general, MacArthur keeps his rank, active duty status and pay ($18,761) for life.