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The military can hardly be blamed for civilian inflation; but the military has shown little ingenuity in stretching its dollar to make up for rising costs. The Army, for example, had been issuing six pairs of trousers to each new recruit—simply because it thought that Marines got six pairs apiece. Not until two years ago did the Army learn that the Marines issued only three pairs —and that many an Army recruit threw at least three of his six pairs away. Faced with this blunt fact, the Army forthwith halved its issue. Said the Hoover Commission: "The military services are far too prodigal with Government funds."
Another big share of housekeeping money (26¢ out of every defense dollar) went for maintenance and operation of ships, planes and military bases. These costs also rose, in some instances quadrupled. Today's destroyer costs almost $1,000,000 a year to run, v. $293,000 in 1940. A B17, once the No. 1 U.S. heavy bomber, used to cost $145 an hour to operate; the B-36 costs $1,000 an hour.
WHAT 18¢ BOUGHT
By the time housekeeping and such other costs as research and administration were taken out of the pre-Korean defense dollar (see chart), only 18¢ was left for the actual purchase of tanks, guns, ships, aircraft and other weapons. For that 18¢, the U.S. did not get much. Chief reason: postwar equipment is so much more complex than that of World War II that the price has gone up astronomically. Examples:
¶A Navy fighter once carried only $300 worth of electronic equipment; Navy jet fighters of today carry $11,000 worth.
¶A single B-17 bomber cost $300,000; a B-36 costs about $4,000,000.
¶A light tank used to cost $25,000; today a light tank costs $175,000 (though mass production might bring the price down as much as 20%).
Besides limiting procurement of new equipment, the high prices had another effect: they forced the armed forces to cut drastically the amount spent to improve weapons. The Army, which wanted $20 million a year for developing new tanks, got only $7,000,000, which was far less than the Ford Motor Co., for example, spends on bringing out a new model.
Thus the tanks that were produced were not as good as they should have been. On top of the rising costs of individual weapons, the Army stepped up the fire power of its divisions and added more weapons and men. The result was that an infantry division, which cost $14.5 million to outfit in World War II, cost $74.3 million (pre-Korea). The cost of equipping an armored division has risen from $30 million to $200 million.
WHEN POLITICS HURT
But in addition to high prices and the haste and waste of demobilization there was one other major cause for the sorry state of U.S. preparedness at the time of Korea. It was shortsightedness in Washington.