(2 of 3)
The Communist leaders, if Russia suffered real destruction, could abandon their own industrial cities and set up their new power centers in the great capitals and industrial complexes of Western Europe. Confronted with such a vast fact, the U.S. would be faced with these alternatives: 1) to try to bomb the Russians out of Europe, which would mean utter destruction of the ancient seats of Western civilization; 2) to mount an invasion of Europe, in the teeth of the Red army forces and their atomic bombs; 3) to let the Communists keep their hold on Western Europe—and pray.
Conclusion. Militarily, preventive war by the U.S. in 1950 would be a blunder of tragic proportions. The U.S. would lose more than it could hope to gain. In such a situation the question of the morality of preventive war, which troubles many Americans, may not even arise. Whether or not preventive war is morally bad, the facts of 1950 make it military nonsense.
WAR IN 1953?
Pro. Western Europe, defenseless now, can be made defensible if the U.S. and its Allies immediately start an urgent program of mobilization and armament. A world crisis in 1953 could confront the Russians with the possibility of atomic attack by the U.S. and at the same time deny them their present opportunity to take Western Europe. If they had to fight hard for Western Europe, their pipeline to the front would need filling from factories—which could be destroyed by bombing. Under such circumstances the U.S. atomic superiority would have more chance that it now has of being strategically decisive.
Con. But the Russians in 1953 will have increased their atomic stockpile, thus materially reducing the present U.S. advantage in atomic weapons.
Conclusion. The U.S. advantage in preponderance of bombs is less important than the strategic framework within which the bombs might be used. In spite of its lessening atomic lead, the U.S. would have a better chance of winning a war in 1953 than in 1950, provided Western Europe were vigorously defended by 60 good European and U.S. divisions. Under these circumstances the free world could reasonably hope that the Kremlin would suspend its present aggressive drive. Only under such circumstances would talk of the "peaceful coexistence" of the free world and the U.S.S.R. begin to make sense.
WAR LATER
Pro. Neither Europe nor the U.S. wants to move fast enough to make Europe defensible by 1953. A later date would be more "realistic."
Con. Nothing could be more realistic than the fact that the longer Europe stays defenseless (while the U.S.S.R. makes A-bombs), the more the danger of war increases—and the greater grows the threat that the West would lose the war.
Conclusion. Postponing preparations for a possible showdown beyond a 1953 deadline is a disguised policy of drift; it is just waiting for the atomic dust to settle on Chicago.
All these possibilities are dangerous, but the second—intensive preparation for a showdown by 1953—seems the least perilous of the three. This path has, however, a special pitfall which could make it the most dangerous of all. If the U.S. and its Allies do not start intensive defense preparations immediately, or if they adopt half-measures, or if they are lulled by Russian conciliatory gestures into stopping halfway, then they will place themselves in a worse position than their present one.