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The Attack. First priority was to make sure that the U.S. was in a position to survive an initial, devastating attack against the nation's industrial centers, and that the J.C.S. recognized it as a job primarily for air power—Navy air as well as Air Force. The Soviet Union now has some 350 bombers modeled on the 6-29, which could reach almost any point in the U.S., drop their bombs, land on the nearest airfield and surrender. Neither the U.S. radar net nor the U.S.'s interceptor forces were adequate to stop them.
The Air Force, in & out of Joint Chief sessions, has never stopped insisting that it needed the full 70-group force equipped with modern aircraft which was recommended by the Finletter Commission. (Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington told Congress: "Even this number may be low.") Two years after the Finletter report the U.S. has no 70-group Air Force, nor anything near it, nor any appropriations to get it. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, a week after crowing to newsmen that the present 48-group force is now "the equivalent" of the Finletter's 70 groups, said it more accurately in a message to Congress last week: the U.S. now has the equivalent of 52½ groups. An Air Force general testified that if groups with modern equipment was what Congress was talking about, the number was 43 or 44.
The Air Force's case was easily argued. But why, in the age of H-bombs and long-range bombers, did the U.S. need_a bigger Navy? Sherman's predecessor, amiable, ineffectual Louis Denfeld, had never been quite able to explain. Once when a J.C.S. member asked him about the Navy and its plans for antisubmarine warfare, Denfeld sighed: "Oh, you wouldn't understand it."
The Enemy. The Russian navy, Sherman pointed out, is a "very powerful navy"—for Russia's special purposes. And it is growing. Fortnight ago the Russians announced the creation of a separate navy ministry under chunky Admiral Ivan S. Yumashev. His Soviet navy already has 270 submarines, many of the latest design. It is reportedly building its submarine force up to 1,000, and constructing three modern battleships, probably to be used as guided-missile ships.
Devising means to meet the deadly menace of the U.S.S.R.'s submarines was a key task for the U.S. Navy, but it was only part of its function. The Navy's job, Sherman argued, was also to keep the fighting on the far side of the ocean, to help grab advance air bases, and to deliver the U.S.'s fighting strength when it was needed. For all these, the big carrier is still the Navy's most powerful basic weapon; it can roam anywhere, strike far and with surprise. The J.C.S. was willing to listen. In the new budget the Navy had taken the heaviest slash. After the public quarreling over the 6-36, the Chiefs were anxious to prove that the services could get along; Omar Bradley in particular profoundly regretted his "fancy Dans" gibe at the Navy's admirals.