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"If we were to agree that the existence of injustice in the world . . . means that the principle of renunciation of force is no longer respected, then we would have, I fear, torn the [U.N.] Charter into shreds, and the world would again be a world of anarchy . . . It is still possible for the united will of this organization . . . perhaps to make it apparent to the world . . . that there is here the beginning of a world of order."
Through 1957, while the U.S. was in an economic recession, while the U.S.S.R. fired the first ICBM and put up the first space satellite, Dulles was the free world's Unpopular Man. "Damned Dulles," swore an Indian lawyer. "He is responsible for the tensions of the world. He is not allowing the Americans to come to terms with the Russians." "Theologian!" cried a French Cabinet minister. "Eisenhower is the mystic. Dulles is the theologian." His critics increasingly rallied behind a "new approach" to world Communism based upon 1) recognition of Red China, and 2) disengagement in Germany to make what they called "a thaw in the cold war." Critics' choice: a "parley at the summit," presumably similar to the one in which the Russians had promised to work toward reunification of Germany by "free elections" back in July 1955.
But through 1958, as is history, the tough old Secretary, who in 1956 suffered his first bout with cancer, fought up from his low point, won a limited deterrent victory in Lebanon (Eisenhower Doctrine), a strong deterrent victory at Quemoy. Even as Quemoy was being fought out, the Communists opened up a propaganda offensive in Berlin. Dulles' response: 1) the U.S. would stand fast in the city; 2) the U.S. would, because some of its allies wanted to, be willing to negotiate on an all-German settlement but would yield on no basic points; and 3) any agreement with the Communists must be self-enforcing.
"There is a lesson," said he. "We have an armistice agreement with the Communists in Korea. But . . . the Communist side violates every provision of that agreement except the one provision that we enforce; namely, that they shall not advance militarily." A thaw in the cold war? Said Foster Dulles, and Tibet and Iraq were proving him a sure prophet as usual: "Well, Mr. Khrushchev is in a much better position to judge than I am. He lives in the north country where the icy blasts come from."
Zest for Peace
When he stepped down last week, Secretary Dulles knew that his success, for all his efforts, had been limited. The limits: 1) the cold war's boundaries in 1959 were much as they had been in 1953—the rollback had been in men's minds, not real estate; 2) the Communists were still driving hard in the Middle East, threatened to make Iraq their first potential conquest since North Viet Nam; 3) the Communists were showing by their scientific achievements that there were many more fronts to the cold war; 4) the West's resolution, amid all the talk about "flexibility," "disengagement," showed some signs of tiring. But these limits of success as Dulles saw them were only more arguments for more sacrifice, for more devotion to duty to meet a challenge that was sustained.