(8 of 8)
Most Western diplomats hold that if Kassem ever does give way on the arming of the People's Resistance Force, the point of no return will have been passed in Iraq. Some pessimistic observers argue that Kassem is already so much a prisoner of the Reds that it is only a matter of time—and not too much time—until that point is reached. In the face of this looming diplomatic and strategic disaster, the U.S. and British policy of hands off in Iraq seems at first glance negligent. In fact, it is the only policy open to the West. For even if Washington and London trusted Nasser enough to back him in his fight against Kassem, Western support would only further discredit Nasser in Iraqi eyes—and in the eyes of the whole Arab world. And any attempt that the West might make to bring direct pressure to bear on Kassem could only serve to drive him finally and utterly into the arms of the Communists.
Even as things now stand, Iraq marks a major Russian advance in the cold war. With the influence it now wields in Baghdad, the U.S.S.R. has achieved the major role it has so long sought in Middle Eastern affairs. But with that new status, Moscow has also acquired new problems. If the U.S.S.R. decides to push ahead with an attempt to establish an undisguised People's Democracy in Iraq, the Soviets must assume that they will alienate all other Arab nations, inherit the scapegoat position of "imperialist oppressors" that the Western powers have long occupied in Middle Eastern minds.
Converting Iraq into a satellite poses a serious economic problem: though the West could get along without Iraqi oil, Iraq could scarcely get along without Western markets for its oil unless Russia were prepared to buy it—and Russia has no real use for it. Yet should Moscow, because of these political and economic difficulties, order the Iraqi Communists to stop short of an all-out takeover, there is danger that the volatile Iraqi mob, which loves nothing so much as a winner, would begin to turn away from its Red heroes just as it has turned away from Nasser.
As they ponder these pros and cons, Russia's cold-war planners must also be acutely aware of another complicating factor. Abdul Karim Kassem, now the Communists' most useful front man in the Arab world, was once a most useful servant of Nuri asSaid. And so long as Kassem, lifelong conspirator and dissembler, keeps any of the keys of power in Iraq, there is always the chance that he may yet teach Russia a lesson that the West has learned to its sorrow—the lesson that events in the Middle East have their own momentum.