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Unexpected Rejection. The U.S. had expected some NATO allies to reject the offer—notably Norway and Denmark, who have steadfastly refused to have U.S. bombers based on their soil. Norway's Einar Gerhardsen, a 60-year-old ex-road mender who was one of the five Socialist or quasi-Socialist Premiers among the 14 present in Paris, promptly met that expectation. Said Gerhardsen: "We have no plans in Norway to let atomic stockpiles be established on Norwegian territory, or to construct launching sites for intermediate range ballistic missiles." What was not expected was his next statement. Seizing on the fact that the U.S. does not yet have any operational IRBMs to give NATO. Gerhardsen declared: "It is our view that the right course could be to postpone the decision. The time which will in any case elapse before any existing [missile] plans can be implemented could be used to examine the possibilities for renewed negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament."
Denmark's Hans Christian Hansen, another Socialist, echoed the Norwegian line. Then West Germany's tough-minded Chancellor Konrad Adenauer spoke up. Despite the fact that the Bulganin notes talked vaguely of a neutralized Germany —a prospect that is anathema to Adenauer—the West German Chancellor was no longer prepared to accept the U.S. lead in the matter of East-West negotiations. Said he: "I would see no objection to attempting to inquire through diplomatic channels from the Soviet government what precise conceptions form the basis of these proposals."
Demonstrated Need. Clearly, canny old Konrad Adenauer was thinking of the widespread reluctance of Europe's voters to have missiles on their soil unless they were proved absolutely necessary. His implied intent: NATO should demonstrate that they were necessary, by making one more attempt to negotiate with the Russians. Hastily the U.S. delegation set to work reconciling its differences with its allies.
Dulles, who saw no reason to alter the Western disarmament proposals that 56 nations had endorsed in the U.N. and the Soviets had flatly rejected, argued that any new approach to the Russians should be made through the U.N. France's Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, adopting as his own what was originally a British suggestion, urged that, instead, the Soviets be invited to discuss the matter with the Foreign Ministers of the four Western nations on the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee—Britain, France, the U.S. and Canada. In the end, it was the U.S. that gave ground. The compromise solution: any new negotiations should be "preferably within the framework of the U.N.," but if the Soviets balked at that, "we would welcome a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level to resolve the deadlock."