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Off the Hook. Many of the terms of the declaration can be traced to the ingenious brain of India's Krishna Menon, who spent two days in consultation with Nasser last March. Convinced that it would take months to negotiate a multisided agreement between Egypt and the users while the canal stood idle, Menon seized on the idea of working out the terms as a unilateral pledge and registering it with the U.N. as "an international instrument," thus partially answering the charge that the terms could be changed any time and without notice at Nasser's whim. The terms can still be repudiated —so can the treaty—but at a cost of greater publicity and opprobrium. Reportedly, Nasser also confided to Menon that he was willing to let the World Court settle the question of Israeli passage through the canal, saying: "After some months, the court will probably decide against me, but I will be off the hook with the rest of the Arab world"—which is fanatically opposed to any sign of softness to Israel.
A month ago there was brave talk of summoning Egypt before the Security Council for a reckoning. Last week there was no longer any thought of that. U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge declared for the U.S.: "Perhaps no final judgment can be made . . . until it has been tried and in practice." France, Britain and Australia stated subdued reservations, but avoided any irretrievable defiance.
The basic objection to Nasser's offer is that it is a unilateral declaration, which gives the users no sure right of redress in case of abuse. Legal experts found many loopholes Nasser could use, if he chose, to escape the apparent pledges he had made. But given Nasser's good faith, and his need to keep the canal going, the terms seemed workable. Given his bad faith, even a more binding .agreement would be worth little. The test of performance by Egypt over the next few months will prove whether Nasser is really prepared to make an honest and workable accommodation for the shipping nations of the world.