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The Moscow trip went off with bands and bunting, and fortnight ago Gomulka returned with a number of small concessions, but no sense of victory. Thousands of Poles, happy and even a little surprised to see him back, jammed the Warsaw station to welcome him, chant and toss bouquets. But to the chanting throng Gomulka would only say: "We went to Moscow and talked to the Soviet leaders as equals, a very important thing for us. We put an end to the great differences between Soviet words and Soviet deeds. Polish-Soviet friendship can now proceed without serious obstacles in its way."
The Russians had agreed to forget Poland's past debts, which were largely imaginary. On the credit side was a Russian loan of $175 million spread over the next two years and a promise of 1,400,000 tons of grain "to help our present difficuties."
Poles were disappointed that Gomulka had agreed to recognize the "workers" regime in Hungary, though Gomulka had refused to endorse Kadar by name. Instead of getting the Red army out of Poland, he had entered into a new military agreement by which six Soviet divisions would remain in Poland, although their upkeep would in future be paid for by Moscow. His reason: "Safeguarding our security and protecting the sanctity of the Oder-Neisse line." The poison sowed by Stalin was still being harvested by Russia.
In his effort to reorganize party and government. Gomulka is pursuing some highly unorthodox methods, by Stalinist standards. He has proved himself far more liberal than Tito. He is sending a delegation to study farm cooperatives in the Scandinavian countries, another to look into the U.S. building industry. He realizes that farm collectivization has failed, but does not know what to substitute. He promised the Roman Catholic Church that he would permit religious education in the schools in return for the recently freed Cardinal Wyszinski's appeal to his followers to keep the peace.
None of these developments appeared to change Gomulka's standing with the Russians. But when he approached the U.S. for tentative economic aid, Moscow cracked down hard. Nor was Moscow standing for multi-party government, along the lines accepted by Premier Nagy in Hungary's five days of freedom. Said Gomulka bluntly last week: "There will be no freedom for bourgeois [Western-type] political parties in this country." For the anarchy which is the real threat to his power he had a warning: "We shall combat ruthlessly provocateurs, scum, and all those who disturb public order, threaten, or commit lynching."
Although Gomulka had won the esteem, and even the affection of his people, for standing up to Russia, he was also doing a fine job of keeping Poland inside the Soviet orbit. At this moment of history his peculiar balance between Communism and patriotism makes him the ideal leader to both sides.
He sits in a desperate middle: if Poles are content for now to seek to alleviate rather than to overthrow Communism, it is because, watching Hungary's revolt with anguished sympathy, they see that other nations will not come to their aid, and they know that Russia is far more determined to hold a neighboring Poland than a distant Hungary.